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Abstract
The ‘free energy principle’ (FEP) has been suggested to provide a unified the-
ory of the brain, integrating data and theory relating to action, perception, and
learning. The theory and implementation of the FEP combines insights from
Helmholtzian ‘perception as inference’, machine learning theory, and statistical
thermodynamics. Here, we provide a detailed mathematical evaluation of a sug-
gested biologically plausible implementation of the FEP that has been widely
used to develop the theory. Our objectives are (i) to describe within a single
article the mathematical structure of this implementation of the FEP; (ii) pro-
vide a simple but complete agent-based model utilising the FEP; (iii) disclose
the assumption structure of this implementation of the FEP to help elucidate
its significance for the brain sciences.
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1. Introduction
The brain sciences have long searched for a ‘unified brain theory’ capable
of integrating experimental data relating to, and disclosing the relationships
among, action, perception, and learning. One promising candidate theory that
has emerged over recent years is the ‘free energy principle’ (FEP) [1, 2]. The5
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FEP is ambitious in scope and attempts to extend even beyond the brain science
to account for adaptive biological processes spanning an enormous range of time
scales, from millisecond neuronal dynamics to the tens of millions of years span
covered by evolutionary theory [3, 1].
The FEP has an extensive historical pedigree. Some see its origins starting10
with Helmholtz’ proposal that perceptions are extracted from sensory data by
probabilistic modelling of their causes [4]. Helmholtz also originated the notion
of thermodynamic free energy, providing a second key inspiration for the FEP 2.
These ideas have reached recent prominence in the ‘Bayesian brain’ and ‘predic-
tive coding’ models, according to which perceptions are the results of Bayesian15
inversion of a causal model, and causal models are updated by processing of
sensory signals according to Bayes’ rule [5, 6, 7, 8]. However, the FEP naturally
accommodate and description of both action and perception within the same
framework [9] thus other see it’s origins in 20th-century cybernetic principles of
homeostasis and predictive control [10].20
A recognisable precursor to the FEP as applied to brain operation was de-
veloped by Hinton and colleagues, who showed that a function resembling free
energy could be used to implement a variation of the expectation-maximization
algorithm [11], as well as for training autoencoders [12] and learning population
codes [13]. Because these algorithms integrated Bayesian ideas with a notion of25
free energy, Hinton named them as ‘Helmholtz machines’ [14]. The FEP builds
on these insights to provide a global unified theory of cognition. Essentially,
this work generalizes these results by noting that all (viable) biological organ-
isms resist a tendency to disorder as shown by their homeostatic properties (or,
more generally, their autopoietic properties), and must therefore minimize the30
occurrence of events which are atypical (‘surprising’) in their habitable envi-
ronment. For example, successful fish typically find themselves surrounded by
water, and very atypically find themselves out of water, since being out of wa-
2Thermodynamic free energy describes the macroscopic properties of nature, typically in
thermal equilibrium where it takes minimum values, in terms of a few tractable variables.
2
ter for an extended time will lead to a breakdown of homeostatic (autopoietic)
relations. Because the distribution of ‘surprising’ events is in general unknown35
and unknowable, organisms must instead minimise a tractable proxy, which ac-
cording to the FEP turns out to be ‘free energy’. Free energy in this context
is an information-theoretic construct that (i) provides an upper bound on the
extent to which sensory data is atypical (‘surprising’) and (ii) can be evaluated
by an organsim, because it depends eventually only on sensory input and an40
internal model of the environmental causes of sensory input. While at its most
general this theory can arguably be applied to all life-processes [15], it provides
a particularly appealing account of brain function. Specifically it describes how
neuronal processes could implement free energy minimisation either by changing
sensory input via action on the world, or by updating internal models via per-45
ception, with implications for understanding the dynamics of, and interactions
among action, perception, and learning. These arguments have been developed
in a series of papers which have appeared over the course of the last several
years [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 9, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29].
The FEP deserves close examination because of the claims made for its50
explanatory power. It has been suggested that the FEP discloses novel and
straightforward relationships among fundamental psychological concepts such
as memory, attention, value, reinforcement, and salience [2]. Even more gen-
erally, the FEP is claimed to provide a “mathematical specification of ‘what’
the brain is doing” [[2], p.300], to unify perception and action [9], and to pro-55
vide a basis for integrating several general brain theories including the Bayesian
brain hypothesis, neural Darwinism, Hebbian cell assembly theory, and optimal
control and game theory [1]. The FEP has even been suggested to underlie
Freudian constructs in psychoanalysis [25].
Our purpose here is first to supply a mathematical appraisal of the FEP,60
which we hope will facilitate evaluation of claims such as those listed above;
note that we do not attempt to resolve any such claims here. A mathematical
appraisal is worthwhile because the FEP combines advanced concepts from sev-
eral fields, particularly statistical physics, probability theory, machine learning,
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and theoretical neuroscience. The mathematics involved is non-trivial and has65
been presented over different stages of evolution and using varying notations.
Here we first provide a complete technical account of the FEP, based on a his-
tory of publications through which the framework has been developed. Second
we provide a complete description of simple agent based model working under
this formulation. While we note that several other agent based models have70
been presented they have often made use of existing toolboxes which, while
powerful, have perhaps clouded a fuller understanding of the FEP. Lastly we
use our account to identify the assumption structure of the FEP, highlighting
several instances in which non-obvious assumptions are required.
In the next section we provide a brief overview of the FEP followed by75
detailed guide to the technical content covered in the rest of the paper.
2. An overview of the FEP
Broadly the FEP is an account of cognition derived from the consideration of
how biological organisms maintain their state away from thermodynamic equi-
librium with their ambient surroundings. The argument runs that organisms
are mandated, by the very fact of their existence, to minimize the dispersion of
their constituent states. The atypicality of an event can be quantified by the
negative logarithm of the probability of its sensory data, which is commonly
known in information theory as ‘surprise’ or ‘self-information’ and the overall
atypicality of an organism’s exchanges with its environment can be quantified
as a total lifetime surprise [1, 2]. The term surprise has caused much confusion
since it is distinct from the subjective psychological phenomenon of surprise.
Instead, it is a measure of how atypical a sensory exchange is. This kind of sur-
prise can be quantified using the standard information-theoretic log-probability
measure
´ ln ppϕq
where ppϕq is the probability of observing some particular sensory data ϕ in a
typical (habitable) environment. Straightforwardly this quantity is large if the
4
probability of the observed data is small and zero if the data is fully expected,80
i.e., probability 1. To avoid confusion with the common-sense meaning of the
word ‘surprise’ we will refer to it as “surprisal” or “sensory surprisal”.
2.1. R- and G- Densities
The FEP argues organisms cannot minimise surprisal directly, but instead
minimise an upper bound called ‘free energy’. To achieve this it is proposed that85
all (well adapted) biological organisms maintain a probabilistic model of their
typical (habitable) environment (which includes their body), and attempt to
minimize the occurrence of events which are atypical in such an environment as
measured by this model. Two key probability densities are necessary to evaluate
free energy. First it is suggested that organisms maintain an implicit account of90
a best guess at the relevant variables that comprise their environment (i.e. those
variables which cause its sensory data). This account is in the form of a prob-
ability distribution over all possible values of those variables, like a Bayesian
belief; this model is instantiated, and parameterised, by physical variables in
the organism’s brain such as neuronal activity and synaptic strengths, respec-95
tively. When an organism receives sensory signals, it updates this distribution
to better reflect the world around it, allowing it to effectively model its envi-
ronment. In other words, the organism engages in a process similar to Bayesian
inference regarding the state of its environment, based on sensory observations.
This internal model of environmental states is called the “recognition density”100
or the R-density. In order to update the R-density appropriately, the organ-
ism needs some implicit assumptions about how different environmental states
shape sensory input. These assumptions are presumed to be in the form of a
joint probability density between sensory data and environmental variables, the
“generative density”, or G-density. This density is also presumed to be encoded105
within the organsims brain. As we will see, following a Bayesian formalism, this
joint density is calculated as the product of two densities; a likelihood describ-
ing the probability of sensory input given some environmental state and a prior
describing the organisms current ”beliefs” of the probability distribution over
5
environmental states.110
2.2. Minimising Free Energy
Free energy is a (non-negative) quantity formed from the Kullback-Leibler
divergence between the R- and G-densities. Consequently, it is not a directly
measurable physical quantity: it depends on an interpretation of brain variables
as encoding notional probability densities. Note: the quantity ’free energy’115
is distinct from thermodynamic free energy thus here we will refer to it as
informational free energy (IFE).
Minimisation of IFE has two functional consequences. First it provides an
upper bound on sensory surprisal. This allows organisms to estimate the disper-
sion of their constituent states and is central to the interpretation of FEP as an120
account of life processes [1]. However, IFE minimisation also plays a central role
in a Bayesian approximation method. Specifically ideal (exact) Bayesian infer-
ence, in general, involves evaluating difficult integrals and thus a core hypothesis
of the FEP framework is that the brain implements approximate Bayesian in-
ference in an analogous way to a method known as variational Bayes. It can125
be shown that minimising IFE makes the R-density a good approximation to
posterior density of environmental variables given sensory data. Under this in-
terpretation the surprisal term in the IFE becomes more akin to the negative
of log model evidence defined in more standard implementations of variational
Bayes [30].130
2.3. The Action-Perception Cycle
Minimising IFE by updating the R-density provides an upper-bound on sur-
prisal but cannot minimise it directly. The FEP suggests that organisms also
act on their environment to change sensory input, and thus minimise surprisal
indirectly [1, 2]. The mechanism underlying this process is formally symmet-135
ric to perceptual inference, i.e., rather than inferring the cause of sensory data
an organism must infer actions that best make sensory data accord with an
internal environmental model [9]. Thus, the mechanism is often referred to as
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active inference. Formally, action allows an organisms to avoid the dispersion of
its constituent states and is suggested to underpin a form of, homoeostasis, or140
perhaps more precisely homeorhesis [10]. However, equivalently, one can view
action as satisfying hard constraints encoded in the organisms environmental
model [9]. Here expectations in the organism’s G-density (its ”beliefs” about
the world) cannot be met directly by perception and thus an organism must act
to satisfy them. In effect these expectations effectively encode the organism’s145
desires on environmental dynamics. For example, the organisms model may
prescribe it maintains a desired local temperature; we will see an example of
this in Section 7. Here action is seen as more akin to control [10] where be-
haviour arises from a process of minimising deviations between the organisms
actual and a desired trajectory [9]. Note: an implicit assumption here is that150
these constraints are conducive to the organisms survival [1, 2], perhaps arrived
at by an evolutionary process. Other different roles for action within the FEP
have also been suggested, e.g., action as a process of experimentation with the
goal to disambiguate competing environmental models [31, 10]. However, here
we only consider action as a source of control [9, 10].155
2.4. Predictive Coding
There at least two general ways to view most FEP-based research. First the
central theory [17] which offers a particular explanation of cognition in terms
of Bayesian inference. Second a biologically plausible process theory of how the
relevant probability densities could be parameterised by variables in the brain160
(i.e. a model of what it is that brain variables encode), and how the variables
should be expected to change in order to minimize IFE. The most commonly
used implementation of the FEP, and the one we focus on here, is strongly anal-
ogous with the predictive coding framework [6]. Specifically predictive coding
theory constitutes one plausible mechanism whereby an organism could update165
its environmental model (R-density) given a belief of how its environment works
(G-density). The concept of predictive coding overturns classical notions of per-
ception (and cognition) as a largely bottom-up process of evidence accumulation
7
or feature detection driven by impinging sensory signals, proposing instead that
perceptual content is determined by top-down predictive signals arising from170
multi-level generative models of the environmental causes of sensory signals,
which are continually modified by bottom-up prediction error signals commu-
nicating mismatches between predicted and actual signals across hierarchical
levels (see [8] for a nice review). In the context of the FEP the R-density is
updated using a hierarchical predictive coding (see Section 8). This has several175
theoretical benefits. Firstly, under suitable assumption IFE becomes formally
equivalent to prediction error (weighted by confidence terms), which can read-
ily be computed in neural hardware. Hierarchical coding also provides a very
generic prior which allows high-level abstract sensory features to be learned from
the data, in a manner similar to deep learning nets [32]. Finally, the sense in180
which the brain models the environment can be conceptualised in a very direct
way as the prediction of sensory signals. We will also see in Section 8 that this
implementation suggests that we do not even need to know what environmen-
tal features the R- and G-densities constitute a model of. Given appropriate
assumptions, the formalism can be rewritten to depend only on predictions of185
sensory data, along with recursive predictions of the brain variables which en-
code those predictions.
2.5. A technical guide
In the rest of this work we review the FEP in detail but first we provide a
detailed guide to each section. Most of what we present is related to standard190
concepts and techniques in statistical mechanics and machine learning. How-
ever, here we present these ideas in detail to make clear their role for the FEP
as theory of biological systems.
In Section 3 we describe the core technical concepts of FEP including the
R-density, G- density, and IFE. We show how minimising IFE has two conse-195
quences. First, it makes the R-density a better estimate of posterior beliefs
about environmental state given sensory data, thus implementing approximate
Bayesian inference. Second, it makes the IFE itself an upper-bound on sensory
8
surprisal.
In Section 4 we discuss the approximations that allow the brain to explicitly200
instantiate the R-density and thus specify IFE. Specifically, we make the ap-
proximation that the R-density take Gaussian form, the Laplace approximation,
and that brain states, e.g. neural activity, represent the sufficient statistics of
this distribution (mean and variance). Utilising this form for the R-density and
various other approximations we derive an expression for the IFE in terms of the205
unknown G-density only; we refer to this approximation as the Laplace encoded
energy. The derivations in this section are done for the univariate Gaussian
case, but we give an expression for the full multivariate case at the end of the
section.
In Section 5 we look at different forms for the G-density. We start by specify-210
ing simple generative models which comprise the brain’s model of how the world
works, i.e., how sensory data is caused by environmental (including bodily) vari-
ables. We utilise these generative models to specify the brain’s expectation on
environmental states given sensory data in terms of a Gaussian distribution
parametrised by expected means and variances (inverse precisions) on brain215
states. Combining this with the result of the last section allows us to write an
expression for Laplace encoded-energy as a quadratic sum of prediction errors
(difference between expected and actual brain states given sensory data) modu-
lated by expected variances (or inverse precisions), in line with predictive-coding
process theories. Initially we show this for a static generative model but extend220
it to include dynamic generative models by introducing the concept of gener-
alised motion. Again we derive the results for the univariate case but provide
expressions for the multivariate case.
In Section 6 we show how the brain could dynamically minimises IFE. Specif-
ically, we describe how brain states are optimised to minimise IFE through225
gradient descent. We discuss complications of this method when considering
dynamical generative models.
Section 7 demonstrates how action can be implemented as a similar gradi-
ent descent scheme. Specifically we show how, given a suitable inverse model,
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actions are chosen to change sensation such that they minimise IFE. We ground230
this idea, and the mechanisms for perception described in prior sections, in a
simple agent based simulation. We show how an agent with an appropriate
model of the environment, can combine action and perception to minimise IFE
constrained both by the environment and its own expectations on brain states.
In Section 8 we extend the formalism to include learning. Specifically we235
show how the brain could modify and learn the G-density. To facilitate this we
describe notion of hierarchical generative models which involve empirical priors.
We lastly describe a gradient descent schemes which allows the brain to infer
parameters and hyperparameters of the IFE and thus allow the brain to learn
environmental dynamics based on sensory data.240
Finally, Section 9 summarizes the FEP and discusses the implications of its
assumption structure for the brain sciences.
3. Informational free energy
We start by considering a world that consists of a brain and its surrounding
body/environment. For the rest of the presentation we refer to the body and245
environment as simply the environment and use this to refer to all processes
outside of the brain. The brain is distinguished from its environment by an in-
terface which is not necessarily a physical boundary but rather may be defined
functionally; thus the boundary could reside at the sensory and motor surfaces
rather than, for example, at the limits of the cranial cavity. The environment is250
characterized by states, denoted collectively as tϑu, which include well-defined
characteristics like temperature or the orientation of a joint but also unknown
and uncontrollable states, all evolving according to physical laws. The envi-
ronmental states, as exogenous stimuli, give rise to sensory inputs for which
the symbols tϕu are designated collectively. These sensory inputs are assumed255
to reside at the functional interface distinguishing the brain from the environ-
ment, and we assume a many-to-one (non-bijective) mapping between tϑ} and
tϕu [33]. We further assume that the brain, in conjunction with the body, can
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perform actions to modify sensory signals.
We assume that the important states of the environment cannot be directly
perceived by an organism but instead must be inferred by a process of Bayesian
inference. Specifically, the goal of the agent is to determine the probability
of environmental states given its sensory input. To achieve this we assume
organism’s encodes prior beliefs about these states characterized by the joint
density ppϑ, ϕq or G-density. Where the G-density can be factorized into (with
respect to ϑ), the prior ppϑq (corresponding to the organism’s ”beliefs” about the
world before sensory input is received) and a likelihood ppϕ|ϑq (corresponding to
the organism’s assumptions about how environmental dynamics cause sensory
input),
ppϑ, ϕq “ ppϕ|ϑqppϑq. (1)
Give an observation, ϕ “ φ (e.g. some particular sensory data), a posterior260
belief about the environment can then be written as ppϑ|ϕ “ φq. This quantity
can be calculated using the prior and likelihood using Bayes theorem as,
ppϑ|φq “ 1
ppϕ “ φqppφ|ϑqppϑq “
ppφ|ϑqppϑqş
ppφ|ϑqppϑqdϑ. (2)
All the probability densities are assumed to be normalized asż
dϑ
ż
dϕ ppϑ, ϕq “
ż
dϑ ppϑq “
ż
dϕ ppϕq “ 1,
where ppϑq and ppϕq are the reduced or marginal probability-densities conform-
ing to
ppϑq “
ż
dϕ ppϑ, ϕq and ppϕq “
ż
dϑ ppϑ, ϕq. (3)
To calculate the posterior probability it is necessary to evaluate the marginal
integral,
ş
ppφ|ϑqppϑqϑ, in the denominator of equation (2). However, this is
often difficult, if not practically intractable. For example, when continuous
functions are used to approximate the likelihood and prior, the integral may
be analytically intractable. Or in the discrete case, when this integral reduces
to a sum, the number of calculations may grow exponentially with the number
of states. Variational Bayes (sometimes known as ‘ensemble learning’) is a
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method for (approximately) determining ppϑ|ϕq which avoids the evaluation of
this integral, by introducing an optimization problem [20]. Such an approach
requires an auxiliary probability density, representing the current ‘best guess’
of the causes of sensory input. This is the recognition density, or R-density,
introduced in the overview. Again the R-density is also normalised as:ż
qpϑqdϑ “ 1. (4)
We can construct a measure of the difference between this density and the true
posterior in terms of an information-theoretic divergence, e.g., the Kullback-
Leibler divergence [34], i.e.,
DKLpqpϑq||ppϑ|ϕqq “
ż
dϑ qpϑq ln qpϑq
ppϑ|ϕq (5)
An R-density that minimises this divergence would provide a good approxi-
mation to the true posterior. But obviously we cannot evaluate this quantity
because we still do not know the true posterior. However, we can rewrite this
equation as,
DKLpqpϑq||ppϑ|ϕqq “ F ` ln ppϕq (6)
where we have defined F as the informational free energy (IFE),
F ”
ż
dϑ qpϑq ln qpϑq
ppϑ, ϕq . (7)
Note here we have introduced the G-density to the denominator on the right-
hand side. In contrast to equation (5) we can evaluate IFE directly because it
depends only on the R-density, which we are free to specify, and the G-density,265
i.e., a model of the environmental causes of sensory input. Furthermore, the
second term on the right-hand side in equation (6) only depends on sensory
input and is independent of the form of the R-density. Thus, minimising equa-
tion (7) with respect to the R-density will also minimise the Kullback-Leibler
divergence between the R-density and the true posterior. Thus, the result of270
this minimisation will make the R-density approximate the true posterior.
The minimisation of IFE also suggests an indirect way to estimate surprisal.
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Specifically according to Jensen’s inequality [34], the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence is always greater than zero. This implies the inequality,
F ě ´ ln ppϕq. (8)
which means that the IFE also provides an upper bound on the surprisal as
described in Section 1. However, note the IFE is equal to surprisal only when
the R-density qpϑq becomes identical with the posterior density ppϑ|ϕq; i.e., it
is this condition that specifies when IFE provides a tight bound on surprisal275
(see Section 2). Furthermore, while this process furnishes the organism with
an approximation of surprisal it does not minimise it. Instead the organism
can minimise IFE further by minimising surprisal indirectly by acting on the
environment and changing sensory input, see Section 7.
Note: formally ppϕq, which describes the agent’s internal (implicit) prob-280
abilistic predictions of sensory inputs, should be written as as ppϕ|mq. This
follows a convention in Bayesian statistics to indicate that a reasoner must be-
gin with some arbitrary prior before it can learn anything; ppϕq indicates the
prior assigned to p ab initio by agent m. However, this notation is unwieldly
and does not change the derivations that follow thus we will omit this for the285
rest of the presentation.
There are several analogies between the terms in the formalism above and
the formulation of Helmoltz’ thermodynamic free energy. These terms can serve
as useful substitutions in the derivation to come and, thus, we describe them
here. Specifically when the G-density is unpacked in equation (7), the IFE splits
into two terms,
F “
ż
dϑ qpϑqEpϑ, ϕq `
ż
dϑ qpϑq ln qpϑq (9)
where, formally speaking, the first term in equation (9) is an average of the
quantity
Epϑ, ϕq ” ´ ln ppϑ, ϕq (10)
over the R-density qpϑq and the second term is essentially the negative entropy
associated with the recognition density. By analogy with Helmoltz’ thermody-
13
namic free energy the first term in equation (9) is called average energy [Ac-
cordingly, Epϑ, ϕq itself may be termed the energy ] and the second term the290
negative of entropy [35].
In summary, minimising IFE with respect to the R-density, given an ap-
propriate model for the G-density ppϑ, ϕq in which the sensory inputs are en-
capsulated, allows one to approximate the Bayesian posterior. Furthermore
minimising IFE through perception also gives a lower bound on the sensory295
surprisal.
Table 1 provides a summary of the mathematical objects associated with the
IFE.
4. The R-density: How the brain encodes environmental states
To implement the method described above the brain must explicitly encode300
the R-density. To achieve this it is suggested that neuronal quantities (e.g.,
neural activity) parametrize sufficient statistics (e.g., means and variances, see
later) of a probability distribution. More precisely the neuronal variables encode
a family of probability densities over environmental states, ϑ. The instantaneous
state of the brain µ then picks out a particular density qpϑ;µq (the R-density)305
from this family; the semicolon in qpϑ;µq indicates that µ is a parameter rather
than a random variable.
Finding the optimal qpϑ;µq that minimises IFE in the most general case
is intractable and thus further approximations about the form of this density
are required. Two types of approximation are often utilised. First, an assump-310
tion that the R-density qpϑq can be factorised into independent sub-densities
q1pθ1q ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ qN pθN q. Under this assumption the optimal R-density still cannot
be expressed in closed form but an approximate solution (of general form) can
be improved iteratively [36]. This leads to a formal solution in which the sub-
densities affect each other only through mean-field quantities. Approaches that315
utilise this form of the R-density are often referred to an ensemble learning.
This approach is not the focus of the work presented here but for completeness
14
we provide a treatment of unconstrained ensemble learning in Appendix A.
A more common approximation is to assume that the R-density take Gaus-
sian form, the so called Laplace approximation [20]. In this scenario, the suf-
ficient statistics of the Gaussian become parameters which can be optimized
numerically to minimize IFE. For example the R-densities take the form
qpϑq ” N pϑ;µ, ζq “ 1?
2piζ
exp
 ´pϑ´ µq2{p2ζq( (11)
where µ and ζ are the mean and variance values of a single environmental
variable ϑ. Substituting this form for the R-density into equation (7), and
carrying out the integration produces a vastly simplified expression for the IFE.
In following we examine this derivation in detail. For the clarity of presentation
we pursue it in the univariate case which captures all the relevant assumptions
for the multivariate case. We write the formulation for the multivariate case at
the end of the section. For notational ease we define
Z ”a2piζ and Epϑq ” pϑ´ µq2{p2ζq, (12)
to arrive at
qpϑ;µ, ζq “ 1
Z
e´Epϑq, (13)
where here we have drawn on terminology from statistical physics in which the
normalization factor Z is called the partition function and Epϑq the energy of the320
subsystem tϑu [37]. Substituting this equation into equation (9) and carrying
out the integration leads to a much simplified expression for IFE :
F “
ż
dϑ qpϑq p´ lnZ ´ Eq `
ż
dϑ qpϑqEpϑ, ϕq
“ ´ lnZ ´
ż
dϑ qpϑqEpϑq
`
ż
dϑ qpϑqEpϑ, ϕq (14)
where we have used the normalization condition, equation (4) in the second step.
The Gaussian integration involved in the first and second terms in equation (14)
can be evaluated straightforwardly. Specifically, utilising equation (12), the first
15
term in equation (14) can be readily manipulated into
´ lnZ “ ´1
2
pln 2piζq .
Using equation (12) the second term in equation (14) becomes
´ 1
2ζ
ż
dϑ qpϑq pϑ´ µq2 Ñ ´1
2
.
The final term demands further technical consideration because the energy
Epϑ, ϕq is still unspecified. However, further simplifications can be made by
assuming that the R-density, equation (13) is sharply peaked at its mean value325
µ (i.e., the Gaussian bell-shape is squeezed towards a delta function) and that
Epϑ, ϕq is a smooth function of ϑ. Under these assumptions we notice that the
integration is appreciably non-zero only at the peaks. One can then use a Taylor
expansion of Epϑ, ϕq around ϑ “ µ with respect to a small increment, δϑ. Note:
while these assumptions permit a simple analytic model of the FEP, they have330
non-trivial implications for the interpretation of brain function so we return to
this issue at the end of this section and in the Discussion. This assumption
brings about, ż
dϑ qpϑqEpϑ, ϕq,
«
ż
dϑ qpϑq
#
Epµ, ϕq `
„
dE
dϑ

µ
δϑ` 1
2
„
d2E
Bϑ2

µ
δϑ2
+
.
Now substituting back δϑ “ ϑ´ µ we get,
« Epµ, ϕq `
„BE
Bϑ

µ
ż
dϑ qpϑqpϑ´ µq
`1
2
„
d2E
dϑ2

µ
ż
dϑ qpϑqpϑ´ µq2.
Here the second term in the third line is zero identically because the integral
equates to the mean. Furthermore recognising the expression for the variance
in the third term allows us to write
« Epµ, ϕq ` 1
2
„
d2E
dϑ2

µ
ζ. (15)
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Where we identify Epµ, ϕq as the Laplace-encoded energy. Substituting all terms
derived so far into equation (14) furnishes an approximate expression for the
IFE,
F “ Epµ, ϕq ` 1
2
˜„
d2E
dϑ2

µ
ζ ´ ln 2piζ ´ 1
¸
(16)
which is now written as a function (i.e., not a functional) of the Gaussian means335
and variances, and sensory inputs, i.e. F “ F pµ, ζ, ϕq. To simplify further we
remove the dependence of the IFE on the variances by taking derivative of
equation (16) with respect ζ as follows:
dF “ 1
2
#
d
dζ
˜„
d2E
dϑ2

µ
ζ
¸
´ 1
ζ
+
dζ
“ 1
2
#„
d2E
dϑl

µ
´ 1
ζ
+
dζ.
Minimising by demanding that dF ” 0 one can get
ζ˚ “
„
d2E
dϑ2
´1
µ
(17)
where the superscript in ζ˚ indicates again that it is an optimal variance (i.e.,
it is the variance which optimizes the IFE). Substituting equation (17) into
equation (16) gives rise to the form of the IFE as
F “ Epµ, ϕq ´ 1
2
ln t2piζ˚u . (18)
The benefit of this process has been to recast the IFE in terms of a joint density
ppµ, ϕq over sensory data ϕ and the R-density’s sufficient statistics µ, rather340
than a joint density over some (unspecified) environmental features ϑ. Note:
this joint density amounts to an approximation of the G-density described in
equation (1); we shall examine the implementation of this density in detail in
the next section. Furthermore, under these assumptions the IFE only depends
on Gaussian means (first-order Gaussian statistics) and sensory inputs, and not345
on variances (second-order Gaussian statistics), which considerably simplifies
the expression. It is possible to pursue an analogous derivation for the full
multivariate Gaussian distribution under the more general assumption that the
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environment states only weakly covary, i.e., both the variance of, and covari-
ances between, variables are small. Under this assumption the full R-density350
distribution is still tightly peaked and the Taylor expansion employed in equa-
tion (15) is still valid.
To get rid of the constant variance term in equation (18), we write the
Laplace-encoded energy for the full multivariate case, as an approximation for
the full IFE as
Eptµαu, tϕαuq “ ´ ln pptµαu, tϕαuq, (19)
where we define tµαu and tϕαu as vectors of brain states and sensory data re-
spectively, corresponding to environmental variables tϑαu with α “ 1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N
indexing N variables. This equation for the Laplace-encoded energy serves as a355
general approximation for the IFE which we will use in the rest of this study.
Conceptually this expression suggests the brain represents only the most
likely environmental causes of sensory data and not the details of their distribu-
tion per se .However, as we will see later, the brain also encodes uncertainties
through (expectations about) variances (inverse variances) in the G-density.360
Table 2 provides a glossary of mathematical objects involved in the Laplace
encoding of the environmental states in the brain.
5. The G-density: Encoding the brains beliefs about environmental
causes
In the previous section we constructed an approximation of the IFE, which365
we called the Laplace-encoded energy, in terms of the approximate G-density
ppµ, ϕq where the environmental states ϑ have been replaced by the sufficient
statistics µ of the R-density. In this section we consider how the brain could
specify this G-density, and thus evaluate IFE. We start specifying a generative
model of the environmental causes of sensory data (informally, a description of370
causal dependencies in the environment and their relation to sensory signals).
We then show how to move from these generative models to specification of the
G-density, in terms of brain states and their expectations, and finally construct
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expressions for the IFE. We develop various specifications of G-densities for both
static and dynamic representations of the environment and derive the different375
expressions for IFE they imply.
Table 3 provides a summary of the mathematical objects associated with
the G-density in the simplest model and also its extension to the dynamical
generative model.
5.1. The simplest generative model380
We first consider a simplified situation corresponding to an organism that
believes in an environment comprising of a single variable and a single sensory
channel. To represent this environment the agent utilise a single brain state µ
and sensory input ϕ. We then write the organisms belief about the environment
directly in terms of a generative mapping between brain states and sensory data.
Note these equations will have a slightly strange construction because in reality
sensory data is caused by environmental, not brain, states. However, writing the
organism beliefs in this way will allow us to easily construct a generative density,
see below. Specifically we assume the agent believe its sensory is generated as
ϕ “ gpµ; θq ` z (20)
where g is a linear or nonlinear function, parametrized by θ and z is a random
variable with zero mean and variance σz. Thus the organism believes its sensory
data is generated as non-linear mapping between environmental states (here
denoted in terms of its belief about environmental state µ) with added noise.
Similarly we specify the organism beliefs about how environmental state are
generated as
µ “ µ¯` w, (21)
where µ¯ is some fixed parameter and w is random noise drawn from a Gaus-
sian with zero mean and variance σw. In other words, the organism takes the
environment’s future states to be history-independent, fluctuating around some
mean value µ¯ which is given a priori to the organism. There is a potential
confusion here because equation equation (21) describes a distribution over the385
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brain state variable µ, which itself represents the mean of some represented envi-
ronmental state ϑ. Specifically it is worth reiterating that µ¯ and σw are distinct
from the sufficient statistics of the R-density µ and ζ [see equation (11)]. The
variables µ¯ represent the organism’s belief about the future state of the envi-
ronment as encoded in the G-density and σw encodes the organism’s confidence390
in its estimate of those future states. By contrast µ, ζ belong to the R-density,
encoding the organism’s uncertain beliefs about its current environment ϑ. As
we will see in Section 7, there is conflict here because the organism’s best esti-
mate µ (the mean of its subjective distribution over ϑ) may not be in line with
its expectation µ¯ stemming from its model of environmental dynamics.395
To construct the generative density we assume that the noise z is given as
Gaussian, r1{?2piσzs exp
 ´z2{p2σzq( . Then, rewriting equation (20) as z “
ϕ´ gpµ; θq, the functional form of the likelihood ppϕ|µq can be written as
ppϕ|µq “ 1?
2piσz
exp
!
´pϕ´ gpµ; θqq2 {p2σzq
)
. (22)
Assuming similar Gaussian noise for the random deviation w “ µ´ µ¯, in equa-
tion (34), the prior density ppµq can be written as
ppµq “ 1?
2piσw
exp
!
´pµ´ µ¯q2 {p2σwq
)
(23)
where σw is the variance.
Thus far, we have specified the likelihood and the prior of µ which together
determine the G-density ppµ, ϕq according to the identity,
ppµ, ϕq “ ppϕ, µq “ ppϕ|µqppµq.
Next, we construct the Laplace-encoded energy by substituting the likelihood
and prior densities obtained above into equation (19) to get, up to a constant,
Epµ, ϕq “ ´ ln ppϕ|µq ´ ln ppµq (24)
“ 1
2σz
ε2z ` 12σw ε
2
w ` 12 ln pσzσwq , (25)
where the auxiliary notations have been introduced as
εz ” ϕ´ gpµ; θq and εw ” µ´ µ¯.
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which comprise a residual error or a prediction error in the predictive coding
terminology [6]. The quantity εz is a measure of the discrepancy between actual400
ϕ and the outcome of its prediction gpµ; θq. While εw describes the extent to
which µ itself deviates from its expectation µ¯. The former describes sensory
prediction errors, εz, while the latter describe model predictions, εw , (i.e.,
how brain states deviate from their expectation). Each erro term is multiplied
by the inverse of variance which weight the relative confidence of these term,405
i.e., how they contribute to the Laplace-encoded energy. We note in other
works the inverse of variance, know as a precision, is used in these equations
perhaps to highlight that these terms weight the confidence, or preciseness, of
the prediction. However in this presentation we stick to more standard notation
involving variances.410
The above calculation can be straightforwardly extended to the multivariate
case. Specifically, we represent tµαu as a row vector of N brain states, and write
their expectations as
µα “ µ¯α ` wα.
Here twαu is a row vector describing correlated noise sources, thus generally the
fluctuations of each variable are not independent, which all have zero mean and
covariance Σw. We can the write a set of N sensory inputs tϕαu which depend
on combination of these brain states in some nonlinear way such that
ϕα “ gαpµ0, µ1, ..., µN q ` zα. (26)
Again tzαu are noise sources with zero mean and covariance Σz and thus each
sensory input may receive statistically correlated noise. Then, the prior over
brain states may be represented as the multivariate correlated Gaussian density,
pptµαuq “ 1ap2piqN |Σw| exp
ˆ
´1
2
tµα ´ µ¯αuΣ´1w tµα ´ µ¯αuT
˙
, (27)
where tµα ´ µ¯αuT is the transpose of vector tµα ´ µ¯αu; |Σw| and Σ´1w are the
determinant and the inverse of the covariance matrix Σw, respectively. Similarly,
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we can write down the multivariate likelihood as
pptϕαu|tµαuq “ 1ap2piqN |Σz| exp
ˆ
´1
2
tϕα ´ gαpµquΣ´1z tϕα ´ gαpµquT
˙
.
(28)
Now substituting these expressions into equation (19) we can get an expression
of the Laplace-encoded energy as, up to an overall constant,
Eptϕαu, tµαuq “ 1
2
tµα ´ µ¯αuΣ´1w tµα ´ µ¯αuT ` 12 ln |Σw|
` 1
2
tϕα ´ gαpµquΣ´1z tϕα ´ gαpµquT ` 12 ln |Σz|. (29)
The above equation (29) contains non-trivial correlations among the brain vari-
ables and sensory data. It is possible to pursue the full general case, e.g., see
[38] for a nice tutorial on this, but we do not consider this here. Instead we can415
simplify on the assumption of statistical independence between environmental
variables and between sensory inputs. Under this assumption the prior and
likelihood are factorised into the simple forms, respectively,
pptµαuq “
Nź
α“1
ppµαq, (30)
pptϕαu|tµαuq “
Nź
α“1
ppϕα|tµαuq, (31)
where probability densities are the uncorrelated Gaussians,
pptµαuq “
Nź
α“1
1?
2piσαz
exp
 ´rµα ´ µ¯αs2{ p2σαwq( ,
pptϕαu|tµαuq “
Nź
α“1
1?
2piσαw
exp
 ´rϕα ´ gαpµqs2{ p2σαz q( .
This gives the Laplace-encoded energy as
Eptϕαu, tµαuq “
Nÿ
α“1
„ pεαwq2
2σαw
` 1
2
lnσαw

`
Nÿ
α“1
„ pεαz q2
2σαz
` 1
2
lnσαz

, (32)
where the variances σαw and σ
α
z are diagonal elements of the covariance matrices420
Σw and Σz, respectively. In equation (32) we have again used the auxiliary
variables
εαw “ µα ´ µ¯α,
εαz “ ϕα ´ gα,
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The structure of equation (32) suggests that the Laplace-encoded energy, which
is an approximation for the IFE, is a quadratic sum of the prediction-errors,
modulated by the corresponding inverse variances, and an additional sum of425
the logarithm of the variances.
5.2. A dynamical generative model
In the previous section we considered a simple generative model where an or-
ganism understood the environment to be effectively static. Here we extend the
formulation to dynamic generative models which have the potential to support
inference in dynamically changing environments. Again we start by examining
a single sensory input ϕ and a univariate brain state µ. Here we assume that
the agent’s model of environmental dynamics (again expressed in terms of brain
states) follows not equation (21), but rather a Langevin-type equation [39]
dµ
dt
“ fpµq ` w (33)
where f is a function of µ and w is a random fluctuation. A dynamical gener-
ative model can then be obtained by combining the simple generative model,
equation (20), with equation (33).430
The FEP utilizes the notions of generalized coordinates and higher-order
motion [20] to incorporate general forms of dynamics into the G-density. Gen-
eralised coordinates involve representing the state of a dynamical system in
terms of increasingly higher order derivative of its state variables. For example,
generalized coordinates of a position variable may correspond to bare ‘position’435
as well as its (unbounded) higher-order temporal derivatives (velocity, accel-
eration, jerk, and so on) allowing a more precise specification of a system’s
state [20]. To obtain these coordinates we simply take recursively higher order
derivatives of both equation (20) and equation (33).
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For the sensory data:440
ϕ “ gpµq ` z
ϕ1 “ BgBµµ
1 ` z1 (34)
ϕ2 “ BgBµµ
2 ` z2
...
where we have used the notations,
ϕ1 ” dϕ{dt, µ1 ” dµ{dt, µ2 ” d2µ{dt2, etc.
and where z, z1, ... are the noises sources at each dynamic order. Here nonlinear
derivative terms such as µ12, µ1µ2, etc, have been neglected under a local linearity
assumption [18] and only linear terms have been collected. In some treatments
of the FEP it is assumed that the noise sources are correlated [20]. However,
here, for the clarity of the following derivations, we follow more standard state445
space models and assume each dynamical order receives independent noise, i.e,
we assume the covariance between noise sources is zero.
Similarly, the Langevin equation, equation (33), is generalized as
µ1 “ fpµq ` w
µ2 “ BfBµµ
1 ` w1 (35)
µ3 “ BfBµµ
2 ` w2
...
where again we have applied the local linearity approximation and we assume
each dynamical order receives independent noise denoted as w,w1, .... Here, it
is convenient to denote the multi-dimensional sensory-data ϕ˜ as
ϕ˜ “ pϕ,ϕ1, ϕ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ q ” pϕr0s, ϕr1s, ϕr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q
and states µ˜ as
µ˜ “ pµ, µ1, µ2, ¨ ¨ ¨ q ” pµr0s, µr1s, µr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q, (36)
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both being row vectors; where the nth-components are defined to be
ϕrns ” d
n
dtn
ϕ “ ϕ1rn´1s and µrns ”
dn
dtn
µ “ µ1rn´1s.
The generalized coordinates, equation (36), span the generalized state-space
in mathematical terms. In this state-space, a point represents an infinite-
dimensional vector that encodes the instantaneous trajectory of a brain variable
[21]. By construction, the time-derivative of the state vector µ˜ becomes
µ˜1 ” Dµ˜ ” d
dt
pµ, µ1, µ2, ¨ ¨ ¨ q “ pµ1, µ2, µ3 ¨ ¨ ¨ q ” pµr1s, µr2s, µr3s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q.
The fluctuations in the generalized coordinates are written as
z˜ “ pz, z1, z2, ¨ ¨ ¨ q ” pzr0s, zr1s, zr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q,
w˜ “ pw,w1, w2, ¨ ¨ ¨ q ” pwr0s, wr1s, wr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q.
In addition, we denote the vectors associated with time-derivatives of the gen-
erative functions as
g˜ ” pgr0s, gr1s, gr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q and f˜ ” pfr0s, fr1s, fr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q
where the components are given as gr0s ” gpµq and fr0s ” fpµq, and for n ě 1
as
grns ” BgBµµrns and frns ”
Bf
Bµµrns.
In terms of these constructs the infinite set of coupled equations (34) and (35)
can be written in a compact form as450
ϕ˜ “ g˜ ` z˜ (37)
Dµ˜ “ f˜ ` w˜ (38)
The generalized map, equation (37), describes how the sensory data ϕ˜ are in-
ferred by the representations of their causes µ˜ at each dynamical order. Accord-
ing to this map, the sensory data at a particular dynamical order n, i.e. ϕrns,
engages only with the same dynamical order of the brain states, i.e. µrns. The
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generalized equation of motion, equation (38), specifies the coupling between455
adjacent dynamical orders.
As before, in order to obtain the G-density we need to specify the likelihood
of the sensory data ppϕ˜|µ˜q and the prior ppµ˜q. The statistical independence
of noise at each dynamical order means that we can write the likelihood as a
product of conditional densities, i.e.,460
ppϕ˜|µ˜q “ ppϕr0s, ϕr1s, ϕr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ |µr0s, µr1s, µr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q
“
8ź
n“0
ppϕrns|µrnsq. (39)
Assuming that the fluctuations at all dynamics orders, zrns, are induced by
Gaussian noise, the conditional likelihood-density ppϕrns|µrnsq is specified as
ppϕrns|µrnsq “ 1a
2piσzrns
exp
”
´  ϕrns ´ grns(2 { `2σzrns˘ı .
Similarly, the postulate of the conditional independence of the generalized noises
wrns leads to a prior in the form
ppµ˜q “ ppµr0s, µr1s, µr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q “
8ź
n“0
ppµrn`1s|µrnsq (40)
The form of the prior density at dynamical order n is fixed by the assumption
of Gaussian noise, which is then given as
ppµrn`1s|µrnsq “ 1a
2piσwrns
exp
”
´  µrn`1s ´ frns(2 { `2σwrns˘ı .
Utilizing equations (39) and (40), the G-density is specified as
ppϕ˜, µ˜q “
8ź
n“0
ppϕrns|µrnsqppµrn`1s|µrnsq. (41)
Given the G-density, the Laplace-encoded energy can be calculated (equation (19))
to give, up to a constant,
Epµ˜, ϕ˜q “
8ÿ
n“0
"
1
2σzrns
rεzrnss2 ` 12 lnσzrns
*
`
8ÿ
n“0
"
1
2σwrns
rεwrnss2 ` 12 lnσwrns
*
(42)
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where εzrns and εwrns are nth component of the vectors ε˜z and ε˜w, respectively,
which have been defined to be
εzrns ” ϕrns ´ grns and εwrns ” µrn`1s ´ frns.
As before, the auxiliary variables, εzrns and εwrns, encode prediction errors: εzrns
is the error between the sensory data ϕrns and its prediction grns at dynamical
order n. Likewise, εwrns measures the discrepancy between the expected higher-
order output µrn`1s and its generation frns from dynamical order n. Typically
only dynamics up to finite order are considered. This can be done by setting
the highest order term to random fluctuations, i.e.,
µrnmaxs “ wrnmaxs
where wrnmaxs has large variance; thus, the corresponding error term in equa-
tion (42) will be close to zero and effectively eliminated from the expression for
the Laplace-encoded energy. In effect it means that the order below is uncon-465
strained, and free to change in a way that best fits the incoming sensory data.
This is related to the notion of empirical priors as discussed in Section 8.1. Thus
we have expressed Laplace-encoded energy for dynamics environment, which is
an approximation for the IFE, is a quadratic sum of the sensory prediction-error,
εwrns, and model prediction errors, εwrns, across different dynamical orders.470
Again each error term is modulated by the corresponding variances describing
the degree of certainty in those predictions.
Again its is straightforward we can generalise this to the multivariate case.
We set tϕ˜αu and tµ˜αu as vectors of brain states and rewrite equations (37) and
(38) as475
ϕ˜α “ g˜α ` z˜α (43)
Dµ˜α “ f˜α ` w˜α, (44)
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where α runs from 1 to N . Thus, equation (42) becomes
Eptµ˜αu, tϕ˜αuq “
Nÿ
α“1
8ÿ
n“0
#
1
2σαzrns
rεαzrnss2 `
1
2
lnσαzrns
+
`
Nÿ
α“1
8ÿ
n“0
#
1
2σαwrns
rεαwrnss2 `
1
2
lnσαwrns
+
(45)
where we have again used the auxiliary variables
εαzrns ” ϕαrns ´ gαrns (46)
εαwrns ” µαrn`1s ´ fαrns. (47)
Thus this constitutes an approximation of IFE for a multivariate system across
arbitrary number of dynamical orders.
6. IFE minimisation: How organisms infer environmental states480
In the previous section we demonstrated how to go from a generative model,
specifying the organism’s beliefs about the environment, to a generative density
given expectations on brain states, and finally to an expression for the IFE.
In this section we discuss how organisms could minimises IFE to make the R-
density a good approximation of the posterior and thus we begin to outline a full485
biologically plausible process theory. In particular, here, we focus on how this
minimisation could be implemented in neuronal dynamics of the brain outlining
one particular process theory.
Under the FEP it is proposed that the innate dynamics of the neural ac-
tivity evolves in such a way as to minimise the IFE. Specifically, it is sug-
gested that brain states change in such way that they implement a gradient
descent scheme on IFE referred to as recognition dynamics. Under the proposed
gradient-descent scheme, a brain state µα is updated between two sequential
steps t and t` 1 as
µt`1α “ µtα ´ κµˆα ¨∇µαEptµαu, tϕαuq
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where κ is the learning rate and µˆα is the unit vector along µα. This process
recursively modifies brain states in a way that follows the gradient of Laplace-
encoded energy. In the continuous limit the update µαt`1´µαt may be converted
to a differential form as
µt`1α ´ µtα ” 9µα.
Then, the above discrete updating-scheme can be transformed into a spatio-
temporal differential equation,
9µα “ ´κµˆα ¨∇µαEptµαu, tϕαuq. (48)
The essence of the gradient descent method, as described in equation (48), is
that the minima of the objective function E, i.e., the point where ∇µE “ 0,490
occur at the stationary solution when 9µα vanishes. Thus the dynamics of the
brain states settle at a point where the Laplace-encoded energy is minimized.
To update dynamical orders of the brain state µα, equation (48) must be
further generalized to give
µαrn`1s ´ µαrns ” ´κµˆαrns ¨∇µ˜αEptµ˜αu, tϕ˜αuq
where µˆαrns is the unit vector along µαrns, nth-component of the generalized
brain state µ˜α (Section 5.2). Also, as before (equation (48)) the sequential
dynamical order pn, n` 1q can be recast into a differential form to give
µ1αrns “ ´κµˆαrns ¨∇µ˜αEptµ˜αu, tϕ˜αuq. (49)
Note that in order to be consistent with the definition of the generalised co-
ordinates we have used the distinctive notation for the temporal derivative of
dynamic update from the parametric update, equation (48). Here, we face a
complication because the temporal derivative of the dynamical order µαrns is
already contained within the generalized coordinates, i.e., µ1αrns “ µαrn`1s, in
virtue of the definition of the latter. Consequently, it is not possible to make
µ1αrns vanish at any order, meaning that the gradient descent procedure is unable
to construct a stationary solution at which the gradient of the Laplace-encoded
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energy vanishes. However, it can be argued that the motion of a point (velocity),
i.e. 9˜µα, in the generalized state-space is distinct from the ‘trajectory’ encoded
in the brain (flow velocity) [20, 36, 21]. The latter object is denoted by Dµ˜α
where D implies also a time-derivative operator which, when acted on µ˜, results
in (see Section 5.2)
Dµ˜α ” pµ1αr0s, µ1αr1s, µ1αr2s ¨ ¨ ¨ q ” pµ1α, µ2α, µ3α ¨ ¨ ¨ q,
but is by this assumption distinct from the usual time-derivative 9˜µα, i.e. µ1αrns ‰
9µαrns. The term ‘velocity’ here has been adapted by analogy with velocity in
mechanics in the sense that 9˜µα denotes first order time-derivative of ‘position’,
namely the bare variable µ˜α. Prepared with this extra theoretical construct,
the gradient descent scheme is restated in the FEP as
9µαrns ´Dµαrns “ ´κµˆαrns ¨∇µ˜αEptµ˜αu, tϕ˜αuq (50)
where Dµαrns “ µ1αrns. According to this formulation, E is minimized with
respect to the generalized state µ˜α when the ‘path of the mode’ (generalized
velocity) is equal to the ‘mode of the path’ (average velocity), in other words495
the gradient of E vanishes when 9˜µα “ Dµ˜α. It is worth noting that in ‘static’
situations where generalized motions are not required (see section 8.4), the
concept of the ‘mode of the path’ is not needed, i.e. Dµ˜α ” 0 by construction.
In such situations we consider the relevant brain variables µα to reach the desired
minimum when there is no more temporal change in µα in the usual sense, i.e.500
when 9µα “ 0.
In sum, these equations specify sets of first order ordinary differential equa-
tions that could be straightforwardly integrated by neuronal processing, e.g.,
they are very similar equations for firing rate dynamics in neural networks (e.g,
see [40]). Continuously integrating these equations in the presence of stream505
of sensory data would make brain states continuously minimise IFE and thus
implement approximate inference on environmental states. Furthermore with
additional assumption about there implementation [41] they become strongly
analogous to the predictive coding framework [6].
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7. Active inference510
A central appeal of the FEP is that it suggests not only an account of
perceptual inference but also an account of action within the same framework:
active inference. Specifically while perception minimises IFE by changing brain
states to better predict sensory data, action instead acts on the environment to
alter sensory input to better fit sensory predictions. Thus action minimises IFE515
indirectly by changing sensations.
In this section we describe a gradient-descent scheme analogous to that in
the previous section but for action. To ground this idea for action, and combine
it with the framework for perceptual inference discussed in previous sections,
we present an implementation of a simple agent-based model.520
Under the FEP action does not appear explicitly in the formulation of IFE
but minimises IFE by changing sensory data. To evaluate this the brain must
have a inverse model [42] of how sensory data change with action [9]. Specifically,
for a single brain state variable µ we write this as ϕ “ ϕpaq where a represents
the action and ϕ is a single sensory channel ϕ. Given this relationship we can
then write the gradient of the Laplace-encoded energy with respect to action
using the chain rule as,
dEpµ, ϕq
da
” dϕ
da
BEpµ, ϕq
Bϕ . (51)
Thus we can write the same gradient decent scheme outlined in the last section
to calculate the actions that minimise the Laplace-encoded energy as
9a “ ´κa dϕ
da
dEpµ, ϕq
dϕ
(52)
where κa is the learning rate associated with action.
It is straightforward to write this gradient descent scheme for a vector of
brain states in generalised coordinates as
9a “ ´κa
ÿ
α
dϕ˜α
da
¨∇ϕ˜α Eptµ˜αu, tϕ˜αuq. (53)
The idea that brains innately possess a inverse model, at first glance, seems
somewhat troublesome. However, under the FEP the execution of motor control
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depends only on predictions about proprioceptors (internal sensors) which can
be satisfied by classic reflex arcs [43, 9]. On this reading exteroceptive, and525
perhaps interoceptive [10], sensations are only indirectly minimised by action.
While a full assessment of this idea’s implications is outside the remit of this
work, it provides an interesting alternative to conventional notions of motor
control, or behaviour optimisation, that rest on maximising or minimising value
[43].530
To give a concrete example of how perceptual and active inference work
we present an implementation of a simple agent-based model. Specifically we
present a model that comprises a mobile agent that must move to achieve some
desired local temperature, Tdesire. The agent’s environment, or generative pro-
cess [9], consists of a 1-dimensional plane and a simple temperature source. The
agent’s position on this plane is denoted by the environmental variable ϑ and
the agent’s temperature depends on its position in the following manner,
T pϑq “ T0
ϑ2 ` 1 , (54)
where T0 is the temperature at the origin, i.e., this equation gives the true
dynamics of the agents’ environment (the environmental causes of its sensory
signals). The corresponding temperature gradient is readily given by,
dT
dϑ
“ ´T0 2ϑpϑ2 ` 1q2 ” Tϑ.
The temperature profile is depicted by the black line in Fig. 1a. We allow the
agent to sense both the local temperature and the temporal derivative of this
temperature
ϕ “ T ` zgp (55)
ϕ1 “ Tϑϑ1 ` z1gp (56)
where zgp and z
1
gp are normally distributed noise in the sensory readings. Note
that the subscript gp reminds us that this noise is a part of the agent’s environ-535
ment (rather than its brain model) described by the generative process.
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In this model the agent is presumed to sit on a flat frictionless plane and,
thus, in the absence of action the agent is stationary. We allow the agent to set
its own velocity by setting it equal to the action variable a as,
ϑ1 “ a. (57)
The agent has brain state µ which represents the agents estimate of its tem-
perature in the environment. Following equations (35), we write a generative
model for the agent, up to third order, as
µ1 “ fpµq ` w where fpµq ” ´µ` Tdesire
µ2 “ ´µ1 ` w1
µ3 “ w2,
where the third order term is just random fluctuations with large variance and540
thus is effectively eliminated from the expression for the Laplace-encoded energy,
see Section 5.2. Following equation (34), we write the agent’s belief about it’s
sensory data only to first order as,
ϕ “ gpµq ` z where gpµq ” µ
ϕ1 “ µ1 ` z1
Note the actual environment is not dynamic but the agent’s belief about the
environment is. Indeed, examining the agent’s generative model we easily see545
that it possesses a stable equilibrium point at Tdesire. In effect the agent believes
in a environment where the forces it experiences naturally move it to its desired
temperature, see Section 2 and [9]. However, these dynamics are different to
those that describe the environment thus the agent must take action to make
the environment conform.550
We can write the Laplace-encoded energy, equation (45), for this model, as
Epµ˜, ϕ˜q “ 1
2
„
1
σzr0s
pεzr0sq2 ` 1σzr1s pεzr1sq
2 ` 1
σwr0s
pεwr0sq2 ` 1σwr1s pεwr1sq
2

,
(58)
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where the various error terms are given as
εzr0s “ ϕ´ µ
εzr1s “ ϕ1 ´ µ1
εwr0s “ µ1 ` µ´ Tdesire
εwr1s “ µ2 ` µ1.
Also, σzr0s, σzr1s, σwr0s, and σwr1s in equation (58) are the variances correspond-
ing to the noise terms z, z1, w, and w1, respectively. In addition we have dropped
logarithm of variance terms, see equation (24) because they play no role when
we minimise these equations with respect to the brain variable µ.555
Note, that the noise terms in the agents internal model are distinct from
those in equation (56) and represent the agents beliefs about the noise on en-
vironmental states and sensory data rather than the actual noise on these vari-
ables. As we will see these terms effectively represent the confidence of the agent
in its own sensory input.560
Using the gradient decent scheme described in equation (50) we write the
recognition dynamics as
9µ “ µ1 ´ κa
„
´ εzr0s
σzr0s
` εwr0s
σwr0s

9µ1 “ µ2 ´ κa
„
´ εzr1s
σzr1s
` εwr0s
σwr0s
` εwr1s
σwr1s

(59)
9µ2 “ ´κa εwr1s
σwr1s
.
Here we have considered generalised coordinates up to second order only. To
allow the agent to perform action we must provide it with an inverse model,
which we assume is hard-wired [9]. Replacing the agent’s velocity with the
action variable a in equation (56) we specify this as
dϕ1
da
“ d
da
`
aTϑ ` z1gp
˘ “ Tϑ. (60)
Effectively the agent believes that action changes the temperature in a way that
is consistent with it’s beliefs about the temperature gradient. Given this inverse
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model we can write down the minimisation scheme for action as.
9a “ ´κa
„
dϕ
da
BE
Bϕ `
dϕ1
da
BE
Bϕ1

“ ´κaTϑ εzr1s
σzr1s
. (61)
Thus, equations (59) through (61) describe the complete agent-environment
system and can be straightforwardly integrated (see Appendix B for details).
Fig. 1 shows the behaviour of the agent in the absence of action, i.e., when565
the agent is unable to move. We examine two conditions. In a first condition
the agent’s sensory variances σzr0s, σzr1s are several orders of magnitude smaller
than model variances σwr0s and σwr1s. Thus the agent has higher confidence (see
Section 5.1) in sensory input than in its internal model. Under this condition
the agent successfully infers both the local temperature and its corresponding570
derivatives, see Fig. 1b black lines. In effect the agent ignores its internal model
and the gradient decent scheme is equivalent to a least mean square estimation
on the sensory data, see supplied code in Appendix B. In a second condition,
see Fig. 2 red lines, we equally balance internal model and sensory variances
(σzris “ σwris, i “ 0, 1). Now minimisation of IFE cannot satisfy both sensory575
perception and predictions of the agent’s internal model, i.e., what the agent
perceives is in conflict with what it desires. Thus the inferred local temperature
sits somewhere between its desired and sensed temperature, see Fig. 1b.
In Fig. 2, after an initial period, the agent is allowed to act according to
equation (61). It does so by changing the environment to bring it in line with580
with sensory predictions and the desires encoded within its dynamic model, i.e.,
the agent moves toward the desired temperatures.
The reduction of surprisal can be quantified as the difference between the
Laplace-encoded energy (and thus IFE) in presence and absence of action, i.e.,
the difference between black and red traces in Fig. 2e, respectively. Specifically,585
it is the portion of the IFE that must be minimised by acting on the environment
rather than through optimisation of the agent’s environment model. We leave
a more explicit quantification of the dynamics of surprisal for future work.
In summary we have presented an example of an agent performing a very
simple task under the FEP. The model demonstrates how the minimisation590
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Figure 1: Perceptual inference: The agent’s environment comprises a simple temper-
ature gradient (a), the blue and magenta lines give the actual and desired positions
of the agent, respectively. The agent performs simple perceptual inference (b), the
dynamics of three generalized coordinates, µ, µ1 and µ2, are given in the top, middle
and bottom panels, respectively. Two conditions are shown, when the confidence in
the sensory input is high (i.e. σzris is small in comparison to σwris), black line, and
when confidence is equal between the internal model and sensory input, red line, re-
spectively. IFE in both conditions monotonically decreases (c): black and red traces,
respectively. The tension between sensory input and internal model manifests a rel-
atively high value of IFE (c) (red curve), compared to the case where sensation has
much higher confidence than the internal model (black curve).
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Figure 2: Perceptual and active inference: An agent with equal confidence in its
internal model and sensory input σzris “ σwris “ 1 is allowed to act at t “ 25. The
agent acts, see (d), to alter its position, see (a: orange line), to bring down its initial
temperature (T “ 20) to the desired temperature (T “ Tdesire “ 4), see (a: blue line).
It does this by bringing its sensory data (c) in line with its desire, i.e., ϕ “ Tdesire and
thus the brain state becomes equal to its desired state, see (b). IFE was calculated in
the presence and absence of the onset of action at t “ 25, see e, black and red lines,
respectively. First IFE is reduced by inference (t ă 25), then later through action (e:
black line).
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of IFE can underpin both perception and action. Furthermore, it shows how
a tension between desires and perception can be reconciled through action.
Many other agent based implementations of the FEP have been presented in
the literature, .e.g. [9], which can be constructed in a similarly simplistic way.
8. Hierarchical Inference and Learning595
In the previous sections we developed the FEP for organisms given simple
dynamical generative models. We then investigated the emergence of behaviour
in a simulated organism (agent) furnished with an appropriate generative model
of a simple environment. The assumption here was that organisms possess
some knowledge or beliefs of about how the environment works a priori, in600
the form of a pre-specified generative model. However, another promise of
the FEP is the ability to learn and infer arbitrary environmental dynamics
[21]. To achieve this it is suggested that brain starts out with a very general
hierarchical generative model of environmental dynamics which is moulded and
refined through experience. The advantage of using hierarchical models, as we605
will see, is that they suggest a way of avoiding specifying an explicit and fixed
prior, and thus can implement empirical Bayes [44]. In this section we first
provide a description of a hierarchical G-density which is capable of empirical
Bayes [44]. We then combine this with dynamical generative model described
in equation (45) to define what we shall call the full construct. We go on to610
describe how appropriate parameters and hyperparameters of the G-density for
given world could be discovered through learning. We finish this section by
showing how action could be described in this construct.
8.1. Hierarchical generative model
A key challenge for Bayesian inference models is how to specify the priors.615
Hierarchical models provide a powerful response to this challenge, in which
higher levels can provide empirical priors or constraints on lower levels [45].
In the FEP, hierarchical models are mapped onto the hierarchical organisation
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of the cortex [46, 47], which requires extension of the simple generative model
described above.620
We denote µpiq as a brain state at hierarchical level i and we assume M
cortical levels, with i “ 1 the lowest level and i “M as the highest. Then, the
hierarchical model may be written explicitly as [21]
ϕ “ gp1qpµp1qq ` zp0q
µp1q “ gp2qpµp2qq ` zp1q
µp2q “ ¨ ¨ ¨
...
µpMq “ zpMq
which can be written compactly as
µpiq “ gpi`1qpµpi`1qq ` zpiq (62)
where i runs through 1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨M . We further assume that the sensory data ϕ
reside exclusively at the lowest cortical level µp1q and dynamics at the highest
level µpMq are governed by a random fluctuation zpMq, i.e:
µp0q ” ϕ and gpM`1q ” 0. (63)
The hierarchy equation (62) specifies that a cortical state µpiq is connected to
higher level µpi`1q through the generative function gpi`1q. The fluctuations zpiq625
exist at each level, in particular zp0q designating the observation noise at the
sensory interface, and are assumed to be statistically independent.
Having defined the hierarchical model, one can write the corresponding G-
density as
ppϕ, µq “ ppµp0q|µp1q, µp2q, ¨ ¨ ¨ , µpNqqppµp1q, µp2q, ¨ ¨ ¨ , µpMqq
” ppµp0q|µp1qqppµp1q|µp2qq ¨ ¨ ¨ ppµpM´1q|µpMqqppµpMqq. (64)
The second step in equation (64) assumes that the transition probabilities from
higher levels to lower levels are Markovian. Consequently, equation (64) asserts
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that the likelihood of a level, for instance ppµpiq|µpi`1qq, serves as a prior density
for the level immediately below, i ´ 1. The prior at the highest level ppµpMqq
contains information only with respect to its spontaneous noise, which may be
given by a Gaussian form
ppµpMqq “ 1b
2piσ
pMq
z
exp
!
´rµpMqs2{
´
2σpMqz
¯)
(65)
where the mean has been assumed to be zero and σ
pMq
z is the variance. We shall
further assume that the Gaussian noises are responsible for the (statistically
independent) fluctuations at all hierarchical levels. Accordingly, the likelihoods
ppµpiq|µpi`1qq are given as
ppµpiq|µpi`1qq “ 1b
2piσ
piq
z
exp
„
´
!
µpiq ´ gpi`1qpµpi`1qq
)2 {!2σpiqz ) . (66)
and the G-density reduces to
ppϕ, µq “
»– Mź
i“0
1b
2piσ
piq
z
fifl exp˜´ Mÿ
i“0
1
2σ
piq
z
rεpi`1qs2
¸
(67)
where the auxiliary variables εpiq have been introduced as
εpiq ” µpi´1q ´ gpiqpµpiqq. (68)
The quantity εpiq measures the discrepancy between the prediction (estimation)630
at a given level µpiq via gpiq and µpi´1q at a lower-level, which comprises a
prediction error.
Finally, by substituting the G-density, constructed in equation (67), into
equation (19), after a simple manipulation, the Laplace-encoded energy E is
given up to a constant as
Epµ, ϕq “
Mÿ
i“0
"
1
2σ
piq
z
rεpi`1qs2 ` 1
2
lnσpiqz
*
. (69)
The variance of the noise at the top level of hierarchy is typically assumed to
be large and thus the corresponding term in the Laplace-encoded energy equa-
tion (69) is approximately zero. As with the higher dynamical orders discussed635
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above Section 5.2 this means that the level below is effectively unconstrained
(has no prior) and thus this type of inference constitutes an example of empirical
Bayes [44].
Table 4 itemizes the mathematical objects associated with the hierarchical
generative model.640
8.2. Combining hierarchical and dynamical models: The full construct
We now combine the dynamical structure and the multivariate brain states in
a single expression. First we note that under the FEP brain states representing
neuronal activity µα are divided into the hidden states xα and the causal states
vα,
µα “ pxα, vαq.
Then, the full FEP implementation can be derived formally by extending equa-
tions (43) and (44) (equation (62))
v˜piqα “ g˜pi`1qα px˜pi`1qα , v˜pi`1qα q ` z˜piqα , i “ 0, 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ .M (70)
Dx˜piqα “ f˜ piqα px˜piqα , v˜piqα q ` w˜piqα , i “ 1, 2. ¨ ¨ ¨ ,M (71)
where the brain-state index runs through α “ 1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N and v˜p0qα designates
the sensory data at the lowest cortical layer, i “ 1. Inter-layer hierarchical
links are made through the causal states and intra-hierarchical layer dynamics
through the hidden states. The generalized coordinates of neuronal brain state
α in hierarchical layer i are given by the infinite-dimensional vectors
x˜piqα ” pxpiqαr0s, xpiqαr1s, xpiqαr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q and v˜piqα ” pvpiqαr0s, vpiqαr1s, vpiqαr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q
where the components are labelled by the subscripts rns, n “ 0, 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,8. Note
that we have introduced different notations in the vector components: The
subscript α for brain states at a given hierarchical level, the superscript piq for
the hierarchical indices, and the subscript rns for the dynamical orders. Recall
that the n-th component of the vector x˜
piq
α and v˜
piq
α are time-derivatives of order
n, namely
x
piq
αrns ”
dn
dtn
xpiqα and v
piq
αrns ”
dn
dtn
vpiqα .
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The other mathematical quantities in equations (70) and (71) are given explicitly
as:
Dx˜piqα “ pxpiqαr1s, xpiqαr2s, xpiqαr3s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q,
z˜piqα ” pzpiqαr0s, zpiqαr1s, zpiqαr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q, and w˜piqα ” pwpiqαr0s, wpiqαr1s, wpiqαr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q.
The generative functions appearing in equations (70) and (71) are specified for
n ě 1, under the local-linearity assumption, as
gαrnspxpi`1qαrns , vpi`1qαrns q ”
Bg
Bvpi`1qαrns
v
pi`1q
αrns ” gpi`1qαrns
and
fαrnspxpiqαrns, vpiqαrnsq ”
Bf
Bxpiqαrns
x
piq
αrns ” f piqαrns.
For the lowest dynamical order of n “ 0,
g
pi`1q
αr0s “ gpxpi`1qαr0s , vpi`1qαr0s q and f piqαr0s “ fpxpiqαr0s, vpiqαr0sq.
It is evident from equation (70) that the causal states v˜
piq
α at one hierarchical
layer are predicted from states at one level higher in the hierarchy v˜
pi`1q
α via645
the map g˜
pi`1q
α : z˜
piq
α specifies the fluctuations associated with these inter-layer
links. Equation (71) asserts that the dynamical transitions of the hidden states
x˜
piq
α are induced within a given hierarchical layer via f˜
piq
α : The corresponding
fluctuations are given by w˜
piq
α . In order to describe these transitions more trans-
parently, we spell out equations (70) and (71) explicitly:650
v˜p0qα “ g˜p1qα px˜p1qα , v˜p1qα q ` z˜p0qα 9˜xp1qα “ f˜ p1qα px˜p1qα , v˜p1qα q ` w˜p1qα
v˜p1qα “ g˜p2qα px˜p2qα , v˜p2qα q ` z˜p1qα 9˜xp2qα “ f˜ p2qα px˜p2qα , v˜p2qα q ` w˜p2qα
...
...
v˜pM´1qα “ g˜pMqα ` z˜pM´1qα 9˜xpM´1q “ f˜ pM´1q ` w˜pM´1q
v˜pMqα “ z˜pMqα 9˜xpMqα “ f˜ pMqα ` w˜pMqα
where we have set that
ϕ˜α ” v˜p0qα and g˜pM`1qα ” 0.
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Note that the sensory data ϕ˜α reside at the lowest hierarchical layer and are
to be inferred by the causal states v˜
p1q
α at the corresponding dynamical orders.
At the highest cortical layer M the causal states v˜
pMq
α are described by the
spontaneous fluctuations z˜
pMq
α around their means (which have been set to be
zero without loss of generality). Note that the generalized motions of hidden655
states are still present at the highest cortical level, in just the same way that
they manifest at all the other hierarchical levels: the corresponding spontaneous
fluctuations are given by w˜
pMq
α .
Separating brain states into causal and hidden states, we can now express
the G-density by generalizing equation (64) as660
ppϕ˜, µ˜q “
Nź
α“1
ppϕ˜α, µ˜αq “
Nź
α“1
ppµ˜pMqα q
M´1ź
i“0
ppµ˜piqα |µ˜pi`1qα q
ñ
Nź
α“1
ppx˜pMqα , v˜pMqα q
M´1ź
i“0
ppx˜piqα , v˜piqα |x˜pi`1qα , v˜pi`1qα q
“
Nź
α“1
ppx˜pMqα , v˜pMqα q
M´1ź
i“0
ppx˜piqα |v˜piqα qppv˜piqα |x˜pi`1qα , v˜pi`1qα q (72)
where in the second step we have used µ˜
piq
α “ px˜piqα , v˜piqα q and only the causal
states v˜
piq
α are involved in the inter-layer transitions in the third step. Also,
it must be understood that ppx˜p0qα |v˜p0qα q ” 1 in equation (72), which appears
solely for a mathematical compactness. The intra-layer conditional probabilities
ppx˜piqα |v˜piqα q are given as665
ppx˜piqα |v˜piqα q “ ppxpiqαr0s, xpiqαr1s, ¨ ¨ ¨ |vpiqαr0s, vpiqαr1s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q
“
8ź
n“0
ppxpiqαrns|vpiqαrnsq (73)
where in the second step we have made use of the assumption of statistical
independence among the generalized states at different dynamical orders. The
quantity ppxpiqαrns|vpiqαrnsq specifies the conditional density at the dynamical order
n within the hierarchical layer i, where the corresponding fluctuations w
piq
αrns are
assumed to take Gaussian form as
ppxpiqαrns|vpiqαrnsq ”
1b
2piσ
αpiq
wrns
exp
„
´
´
x
piq
αrn`1s ´ f piqαrns
¯2 {´2σαpiqwrns¯ . (74)
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The conditional densities ppv˜piqα |x˜pi`1qα , v˜pi`1qα q appearing in equation (72) link
two successive causal states in the cortical hierarchy which are specified by a
similar Gaussian fluctuation for z
piq
αrns via equation (70) as
ppv˜piqα |x˜pi`1qα , v˜pi`1qα q ”
8ź
n“0
1b
2piσ
αpiq
zrns
exp
„
´
´
v
piq
αrns ´ gpi`1qαrns
¯2 {´2σαpiqzrns¯ .
(75)
What is left unspecified in constructing the G-density fully, i.e. equation (72),
is the prior density ppx˜pMqα , v˜pMqα q at the highest cortical layer. It is given here
explicitly as
ppx˜pMqα , v˜pMqα q ”
8ź
n“0
1b
2piσ
αpMq
wrns
exp
!
´rxpMqαrn`1s ´ f pMqαrnss2{
´
2σ
αpMq
wrns
¯)
ˆ
8ź
n“0
1b
2piσ
αpMq
zrns
exp
!
´rvpMqαrnss2{
´
2σ
αpMq
zrns
¯)
. (76)
The prior in the highest cortical layer, equation (76), comprises the lateral gen-
eralized motions of the hidden states and the spontaneous, random fluctuations670
associated with the causal states. It is assumed that both causal and hidden
states fluctuate about zero means.
Next, the Laplace-encoded energy E can be written explicitly by substituting
equation (72) into equation (19) and incorporating the likelihood and prior
densities, equations (74), (75), and (76), at all hierarchical layers and dynamical675
orders. After a straightforward manipulation, we obtain the Laplace-encoded
energy for a specific brain variable µα as
Eαpµ˜α, ϕ˜αq “
8ÿ
n“0
$&% 12ΩαpMqwrns
´
x
pMq
αrn`1s ´ f pMqαrns
¯2 ` 1
2
ln Ω
αpMq
wrns
,.-
`
8ÿ
n“0
$&% 12ΩαpMqzrns
´
v
pMq
αrns
¯2 ` 1
2
ln Ω
αpMq
zrns
,.-
`
M´1ÿ
i“1
8ÿ
n“0
$&% 12Ωαpiqwrns
´
x
piq
αrn`1s ´ f piqαrns
¯2 ` 1
2
ln Ω
αpiq
wrns
,.-
`
M´1ÿ
i“0
8ÿ
n“0
$&% 12Ωαpiqzrns
´
v
piq
αrns ´ gpi`1qαrns
¯2 ` 1
2
ln Ω
αpiq
zrns
,.-
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where the first and second terms are from prior-densities at the highest layer,
equation (76), the third term is from equation (74), and last term from equa-
tion (75). A quick inspection reveals that the first and second terms can be ab-680
sorbed into the third and fourth terms, respectively. Then, the Laplace-encoded
energy for multiple brain variables is written compactly as
Epµ˜, ϕ˜q “
Nÿ
α“1
Eαpµ˜α, ϕ˜αq
“ 1
2
Nÿ
α“1
8ÿ
n“0
Mÿ
i“1
$&% 1σαpiqwrns
´
ε
αpiq
wrns
¯2 ` lnσαpiqwrns
,.-
` 1
2
Nÿ
α“1
8ÿ
n“0
Mÿ
i“0
$&% 1σαpiqzrns
´
ε
αpi`1q
zrns
¯2 ` lnσαpiqzrns
,.- . (77)
where we have defined the prediction errors
ε
αpiq
zrns ” vpi´1qαrns ´ gpiqαrns
´
x
piq
αrns, v
piq
αrns
¯
(78)
ε
αpiq
wrns ” xpiqαrn`1s ´ f piqαrns
´
x
piq
αrns, v
piq
αrns
¯
. (79)
Thus, it turns out that the Laplace-encoded energy is expressed essentially
as a sum of the prediction-errors squared and their associated variances. It685
appears in equation (77) that the structure of the first term differs from the
second term: In the first term the hierarchical index runs from i “ 1 which
indicates the lowest cortical layer, while the second term includes additional
i “ 0 in the hierarchical sum which designates the sensory data, ϕ˜ ” v˜p0q. Note
also in equation (78) that ε
αpM`1q
zrns “ vpMqαrns because the highest hierarchical layer690
is at i “M , accordingly gpM`1qαrns ” 0 by construction.
Table 5 provides the glossary of the mathematical objects involved in the
G-density in the full construct for a single brain activity µα.
To summarize, the ‘full construct’ incorporates into the G-density, both
multi-layer hierarchies corresponding to cortical architecture, and multi-scale695
dynamics in each layer via generalized coordinates. The G-density is expressed
as the sequential product of the priors and the likelihoods, cascading down
the cortical hierarchy to the lowest layer where the sensory data are registered
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(mediated by causal states), and taking into account the intra-layer dynam-
ics, mediated by hidden states. The final form of the Laplace-encoded energy,700
equation (77), has been derived from equation (19) which specifies the Laplace-
encoded energy as the (negative) logarithm of the generative density constructed
for the hidden and causal brain states.
8.3. The full-construct recognition dynamics and neuronal activity
We now describe recognition dynamics incorporating the full construct (sec-705
tion 8.2), given the Laplace-encoded energy Epµ˜, ϕ˜q, equation (77). In the full
construct, the brain states µ˜α are decomposed into the causal states v˜α which
link the cortical hierarchy and the hidden states x˜α which implement the dy-
namical ordering within a cortical layer.
Distinguishing the ‘path of the modes’ from the ‘modes of the path’, see
Section 6, the learning algorithm for the dynamical causal states on the cortical
layer i can be constructed from
9vpiqαrns ´Dvpiqαrns ” ´κz vˆpiqαrns ¨∇v˜αEpµ˜, ϕ˜q (80)
where κz is the learning rate and vˆ
piq
αrns is the unit vector along v
piq
αrns. As men-710
tioned in Section 6, the crucial assumption here is that when the path of modes
becomes identical to the modes of the path, i.e. 9˜vpiqα ´Dv˜piqα Ñ 0, the Laplace-
encoded energy E takes its minimum, and vice versa. The gradient operation
in the RHS of equation (80) can be made explicit to give
vˆ
piq
αrns ¨∇v˜αEpµ˜, ϕ˜q
“ BBvpiqαrns
»– 1
2σ
αpi´1q
zrns
!
ε
αpiq
zrns
)2 ` 1
2σ
αpiq
zrns
!
ε
αpi`1q
zrns
)2 ` 1
2σ
αpiq
wrns
!
ε
αpiq
wrns
)2fifl
“ 1
σ
αpi´1q
zrns
ε
αpiq
zrns
Bεαpiqzrns
Bvpiqαrns
` 1
σ
αpiq
zrns
ε
αpi`1q
zrns
Bεαpi`1qzrns
Bvpiqαrns
` 1
σ
αpiq
wrns
ε
αpiq
wrns
Bεαpiqwrns
Bvpiqαrns
(81)
where one can further see that
Bεαpiqzrns
Bvpiqαrns
“ ´Bg
αpiq
zrns
Bvpiqαrns
,
Bεαpi`1qzrns
Bvpiqαrns
“ 1, and Bε
αpiq
wrns
Bvpiqαrns
“ ´Bf
piq
αrns
Bvpiqαrns
.
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The additional auxiliary variables are introduced:
ξ
αpiq
zrns ” εpiqzrns{σαpi´1qzrns ” Λαpi´1qzrns
!
v
pi´1q
αrns ´ gpiqαrns
´
x
piq
αrns, v
piq
αrns
¯)
, (82)
ξ
αpiq
wrns ” εpiqwrns{σpiqwrns ” Λαpiqwrns
!
x
piq
αrn`1s ´ f piqrns
´
x
piq
αrns, v
piq
αrns
¯)
, (83)
where Λ
αpiq
zrns and Λ
αpiq
wrns are the inverse of the variances,
Λ
αpiq
zrns ” 1{σαpiqzrns and Λαpiqwrns ” 1{σαpiqwrns, (84)
which are called the precisions. Note that the precisions reflect the magnitude715
of the prediction errors.
Its is proposed that the auxiliary variables ξ
αpiq
zrns and ξ
αpiq
wrns represent error
units and that the brain states, v
piq
αrns and x
piq
αrns, similarly represent state units
or, equivalently, representation units, within neuronal populations [23, 1].
In terms of predictive coding or (more generally) hierarchical message pass-720
ing in cortical networks[21], equation (82) implies that the error-units ξ
αpiq
zrns
receive signals from causal states v
pi´1q
αrns lying in immediately lower hierarchical
layer and also from causal and hidden states in the same layer, v
piq
αrns and x
piq
αrns,
via the generative function g
piq
αrns. Similarly, equation (83) implies that the error-
units ξ
αpiq
wrns specify prediction-error in the within-layer (lateral) dynamics: ξ
αpiq
wrns725
designates prediction error between the objective hidden-state x
piq
αrn`1s and its
estimation from one-order lower causal- and hidden-states v
piq
αrns and x
piq
αrns, via
the different generative function f
piq
αrns.
With the help of equation (81), one can recast the learning algorithm equa-
tion (80) to give the dynamics of the causal states as
9vpiqαrns “ Dvpiqαrns ` κz
Bgαpiqrns
Bvpiqαrns
ξ
αpiq
zrns ´ κzξαpi`1qzrns ` κz
Bf piqαrns
Bvpiqαrns
ξ
αpiq
wrns (85)
which shows clearly how hierarchical links are made among nearest-neighbor
cortical layers. Specifically, the representation units of causal states v
piq
αrns are730
updated by the error units ξ
αpi`1q
zrns which reside in the layer immediately above,
and also by the error-units ξ
αpiq
zrns and ξ
αpiq
wrns in the same hierarchical layer, all at
the same dynamical order.
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The intra-layer dynamics of hidden states are generated similarly as
9xpiqαrns ” Dxpiqαrns ´ κwxˆpiqαrns ¨∇x˜αEpµ˜, ϕ˜q
“ Dxpiqαrns ´ κwξαpiqwrn´1s ` κw
Bf piqαrns
Bxpiqαrns
ξ
αpiq
wrns ` κw
Bgpiqαrns
Bxpiqαrns
ξ
αpiq
zrns (86)
where κw is the leaning rate. In passing to the second line in equation (86), one735
needs to evaluate
xˆ
piq
αrns ¨∇x˜αEpµ˜, ϕ˜q
Ñ 1
σ
αpiq
wrn´1s
ε
αpiq
wrn´1s
Bεαpiqwrn´1s
Bxpiqαrns
` 1
σ
αpiq
wrns
ε
αpiq
wrns
Bεαpiqwrns
Bxpiqαrns
` 1
σ
αpi´1q
zrns
ε
αpiq
zrns
Bεαpiqzrns
Bxpiqαrns
,
and an explicit evaluation of the derivatives of the prediction errors, equa-
tions (78) and (79). The hidden-state learning algorithm, equation (86), specifies
how the representation-units x
piq
αrns are driven by the error-units in the current
layer i at both the immediately lower dynamical order ξ
αpiq
wrn´1s and the same740
dynamical order ξ
αpiq
wrns, and also by the error units ξ
αpiq
zrns in the current layer at
the same dynamical order.
To summarize, the hierarchical, dynamical causal structure of the genera-
tive model is fully implemented in the mathematical constructs given by equa-
tions (82) and (83) (specifying prediction errors), and equations (85) and (86)745
(specifying update rules for state-units).
According to these equations, the state units come to encode the condi-
tional expectations of the environmental causes of sensory data, and the error
units measure the discrepancy between these expectations and the data. Er-
ror units are driven by state units at the same layer and from the layer below,750
whereas state units are driven by error units at the same layer and the layer
above. Thus, prediction errors are passed up the hierarchy (bottom-up) and pre-
dictions (conditional expectations) are passed down the hierarchy (top-down),
fully consistent with predictive coding [6].
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8.4. Parameters and hyper-parameters: Synaptic efficacy and gain755
Thus far we have discussed how environmental variables can be inferred
given an appropriate G-density. In this section we discuss how the G-density
itself can be learned. It is proposed that the dynamics of neural systems is
captured by three time-scales, τµ ă τθ ă τγ . The first, τµ, represents the
timescale of the dynamics of sufficient statistics of the encoded in the R-density
i,.e µ ” px, vq as described above. In contrast τθ and τγ represent the slow
timescale of synaptic efficacies and gains which are parameterised implicitly in
equation (77) through the generative functions, f and g, and the variances σ
(or the precisions Λ, equation (84)), respectively. Under the FEP slow variables
are assumed to be approximately ‘static’ or ‘time-invariant’ in contrast to the
‘time-varying’ neuronal states µ [23]. Second, changes in θ and γ (with respect
to a small δt) have a much smaller effect on the Laplace-encoded energy (or
IFE) than do changes in µ, i.e.
BF
Bθ
δθ
δt
! BFBµ
δµ
δt
.
The latter point implies that, from the perspective of gradient-descent, what is
relevant for θ and γ is not the IFE F but the accumulation, more precisely the
integration of F over time [19]
SrF s ”
ż
dtF pµ˜, ϕ˜; θ, γq (87)
where the time-dependence of F is implicit through the arguments. To distin-
guish their different roles, θ
piq
α are called parameters and γ
piq
α are called hyper-
parameters, corresponding to brain state µα, in each hierarchical layer i. Equa-
tions (82) and (83) can now be generalized to include these parameters and
hyper-parameters as
ξ
αpiq
zrns “ Λαpi´1qzrns pγpi´1qα q
!
v
pi´1q
αrns ´ gpiqαrns
´
x
piq
αrns, v
piq
αrns; θ
piq
α
¯)
, (88)
ξ
αpiq
wrns “ Λαpiqwrnspγpiqα q
!
x
piq
αrn`1s ´ f piqαrns
´
x
piq
αrns, v
piq
αrns; θ
piq
α
¯)
. (89)
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The Laplace-encoded energy including θ and γ may therefore be written as
Epµ˜, ϕ˜; θ, γq “ 1
2
Nÿ
α“1
8ÿ
n“0
Mÿ
i“1
!
ε
αpiq
wrnsξ
αpiq
wrns ´ ln Λαpiqwrns
)
` 1
2
Nÿ
α“1
8ÿ
n“0
Mÿ
i“0
!
ε
αpi`1q
zrns ξ
αpi`1q
zrns ´ ln Λαpiqzrns
)
. (90)
We are now in a position to write down the recognition dynamics for the
slow synaptic efficacy θ and for the slower synaptic gain γ. Specifically, gradient
descent for the parameters θ
piq
α is applied using the time-integral of F , given in
equation (87), assuming a static model (i.e., without dynamical order indices),
as
9θpiqα “ ´κθ θˆpiqα ¨∇θS
which, when temporal differentiation is repeated on both sides, gives rise to
:θpiqα “ ´κθ θˆpiqα ¨∇θEpµ˜, ϕ˜; θ, γq. (91)
After explicitly carrying out the gradient on the RHS of equation (91), one ob-
tains an equation to minimise θ
piq
α corresponding to brain variable µα at cortical
layer i
:θpiqα “
8ÿ
n“0
»–κθ BgpiqαrnsBθpiqα ξαpiqzrns ` κθ
Bf piqαrns
Bθpiqα
ξ
αpiq
wrns
fifl (92)
where the summation over the dynamic index n reflects the generalized motion
over causal as well as hidden states. According to Equation (92) synaptic efficacy
is influenced by error-units only in the same cortical layer.
Similarly, the learning algorithm for the hyper-parameters γ, specifically for
γ
piq
α associated with brain’s representation of environmental states µα at cortical
layer i, is given from
9γpiqα “ ´κγ γˆpiqα ¨∇γS
which results in760
:γpiqα “ ´12
8ÿ
n“0
»–κγ BΛαpiqwrnsBγpiqα
!
ξ
αpiq
wrns
)2 ´ κγ BBγpiqα ln Λαpiqwrns
fifl
´1
2
8ÿ
n“0
»–κγ BΛαpiqzrnsBγpiqα
!
ξ
αpi`1q
zrns
)2 ´ κγ BBγpiqα ln Λαpiqzrns
fifl . (93)
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According to this equation, synaptic gains are influenced by error units in the
same layer ξ
piq
w and also by error units in one-layer above ξ
pi`1q
z .
Note that the equations for θ and γ, equations (92) and (93), are by construc-
tion second-order differential equations, unlike the corresponding equations for
state-units µ [equations (85) and (86)], which are first-order in time [20]. Table765
6 provides the summary of mathematical symbols appearing in the recognition
dynamics in the dynamical construct and also in the static construct.
To summarize the FEP prescribes recognition dynamics by gradient descent
with respect to the sufficient statistics µ˜, parameters θ, and hyper-parameters
γ on the Laplace-encoded energy Epµ˜, ϕ˜; θ, γq, given the sensory input ϕ˜. At770
the end of this process, an optimal µ˜˚ is specified which represents the brain’s
posterior expectation of the environmental cause of the observed sensory data.
In theory the second term in the IFE F , equation (18), can be fixed according
to equation (17) thereby completing the minimization of the IFE, although
in practice this is rarely done and the focus is on approximating the means,775
parameters and hyper-parameters.
This whole minimization process is expressed abstractly as
µ˜˚ “ arg min
µ˜
F pµ˜, ϕ˜q (94)
where µ˜˚ is the minimizing (optimal) solution and the conditional dependence
m is expressed explicitly. The resulting minimized IFE can be calculated by
substituting the optimizing µ˜˚ for µ˜ as
F˚ “ F pµ˜˚, ϕ˜ q.
The only remaining task is to specify the generative functions f and g,
which will depend on the particular system being modelled. We have utilised a
concrete model in our calculation in Section 7. Examples of various generating
functions have already been provided[21, 9, 29, 28, 48], to which we refer the780
reader.
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8.5. Active inference on the full construct
The IFE also accounts for an active inference by minimising the IFE with
respect to action, for which a formal procedure can be written as
a˚ “ arg min
a
F pµ˜, ϕ˜paqq (95)
where a˚ is the minimizing solution. Similarly with equation (52) we can write
down the gradient descent scheme for the minimisation in the full construct for
action corresponding to brain’s representation µα as
9aα “ ´κaaˆα ¨∇aαEpµ˜, ϕ˜paqq (96)
where equation (90) is to be used for the Laplace-encoded energy. Then, af-
ter the gradient operation is completed, the organism’s action is implemented
explicitly in the brain as
9aα “ ´κa
8ÿ
n“0
dϕ˜αrns
daα
Λ
αp0q
zrnsε
αp1q
zrns (97)
where ε
αp1q
zrns “ ϕαrns ´ gp1qαrnspxp1qαrns, vp1qαrns; θp1qα q is the prediction-error associated
with learning of the sensory data on the dynamical order n at the lowest cortical
layer and Λ
αp0q
zrns “ Λαp0qzrns pγp0qα q is the precision of the sensory noise. To our785
knowledge most existing models of active inference under the FEP require one
to provide an explicit world model. Thus an important goal for for future work
will be to develop agent based models that work with the full construct.
9. Discussion
The FEP framework is an ambitious project, spanning a chain of reasoning790
from fundamental principles of biological self-maintenance essential for sustain-
able life, to a mechanistic brain theory that proposes to account for a startling
range of properties of perception, cognition, action and learning. It draws con-
clusions about neurocognitive mechanisms from extremely general statistical
considerations regarding the viability of organism’s survival in unpredictable795
environments. Under certain assumptions - which we discuss in more detail
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below - it entails a hierarchical predictive processing model geared towards the
inference and control of the hidden causes of sensory inputs, which both sheds
new light on existing data about functional neuroanatomy and motivates a num-
ber of specific hypotheses regarding brain function in health and in disease. At800
the same time, the current status of much of the research under the rubric of
the FEP does depend on, to different degrees, a variety of assumptions and ap-
proximations, both at the level of the overarching theory and with regard to the
specific implementation (or process theory) the theory proposes. In this section,
we discuss the consequences of some of more important of these assumptions and805
approximations, with respect to the framework and implementation described
in the body of this paper.
A central assumption in this (representative) exposition of the FEP is that
the brain utilizes properties of Gaussian distributions in order to carry out
probabilistic computation. Specifically, the Laplace approximation assumes a810
Gaussian functional form for the R-density and G-density which are encoded by
sufficient statistics, see Section 4. Additionally, it is assumed that the R-density
is tightly peaked, i.e., the variance and covariance are small, see Section 4. This
assumption implies that an organism only represents the expectation value of
environmental variables, and not a distribution over states, see [38, 49, 50] for a815
nice descriptions of this assumption. At first glance this assumption may appear
troublesome, because it suggests that organisms do not directly represent the
uncertainty of environmental variables (hidden causes of sensory signals). This
worry is misplaced, however, since representations of uncertainty enter into the
FEP formalism via precisions on the expectations of brain states that comprise820
the G-density, see equation (32). Intuitively this means that organisms do not
encode uncertainty about world states per se, but rather uncertainties about
their model of how hidden causes relate to each other and to sensory signals.
The main advantage of adopting Gaussian assumptions is that they vastly
simplify the implementation of the FEP, and make it formally equivalent to the825
more widely known predictive coding framework [51, 8, 41], see the Introduction.
Furthermore, it can be argued this implementation is compatible with a plausi-
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ble neuronal functional architecture in terms of message passing in cortical hier-
archies [16]. Specifically, inferred variables (hidden causes) can be represented in
terms of neural firing rates; the details of generative models encoded as patterns830
of synaptic connectivity, and the process of IFE minimisation by the relaxation
of neuronal dynamics [52]. The concept of hierarchical generative models, see
Section 8, also maps neatly onto the hierarchical structure of cortical networks,
at least in the most frequently studied perceptual modalities like vision. Here,
the simple idea is that top-down cortical signalling conveys predictions while835
bottom-up activity returns prediction errors [52]. However, it remains an open
question whether representing the world in terms of Gaussian distributions is
sufficient given the complexities of real-world sensorimotor interactions. For
example, standard robotics architectures have long utilized practical strategies
for representing more complex distributions [53] including (for example) multi-840
modal peaks [54].Other authors have proposed that brains engage in Bayesian
sampling rather than the encoding of probability distributions, suggesting that
sampling schemes parsimoniously explain classic cognitive reasoning errors [50].
Whether these alternate schemes can be used to construct more versatile and
behaviourally powerful implementations of the FEP, and whether they remain845
compatible with neuronally plausible process theories, remains to be seen.
The minimisation of IFE, for both inference and learning, is assumed to
be implemented as a gradient descent scheme. While this has the major ad-
vantage of transforming difficult or infeasible inference problems into relatively
straightforward optimization problems, it is not clear whether the propose gra-850
dient descent schemes always have good convergence properties. For example,
the conditions under which gradient descent will become stuck in local minima,
or fail to converge in an appropriate amount of time, are not well understood.
Furthermore, parameters such as learning rate will be crucial for the timely
inference of the dynamics of variables, as well as central to the dynamics of855
control, see Fig. 1 and 2. Parameters like these, which play important roles in
the estimation of but not specification of the IFE, can be incorporated into
process theories in many ways, with as yet no clear consensus (though see, for
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one proposal [55]).
The implementation described in this paper supports inference in dynamical860
environments. This is based on the concept of generalised motions, whereby
it is assumed that the brain infers not only the current value of environmental
variables (e.g.,position) but also their higher-order derivatives (i.e., velocity,
acceleration, jerk, etc.). This involve both that the relevant sensory noise is
differentiable, and, that interactions between derivatives are linear [18]. The865
extent to which these assumptions are justifiable remains unclear, as does the
utility of encoding generalized motions in practical applications. It is likely,
for example, that signal magnitudes after the second derivative will be small
and carry considerable noise, thus practical usefulness of including higher order
derivatives is unclear, although this may be justifiable in some cases [56].870
Under active inference, prediction errors are minimised by acting on the
world to change sensory input, rather than by modifying predictions. Active in-
ference therefore depends on the ability to make conditional predictions about
the sensory consequences of actions. To achieve this the FEP assumes that
agents have a model of the relationship between action and sensation, in the875
form of an inverse model, in addition to their generative model [57, 29]. In the
general case the specification of an inverse model is non-trivial [42], which at first
glance seems like a strong assumption. However, the FEP suggests generation
of motor actions are driven through the fulfilment of proprioceptive predictions
only, where relations between actions and (proprioceptive) sensations are as-880
sumed to be relatively simple such that minimisation of prediction error can be
satisfied by simple reflex arcs [9, 43]. On this view, action only indirectly affects
exteroceptive or interoceptive sensations, obviating the need for complicated in-
verse models like those described in the motor control literature [42, 43]. In the
implementation of the FEP given in this paper there is no distinction between885
different types of sensory input.
In Section 7 we showed that behaviour is extremely sensitive to precisions.
This is often presented as an advantage of the framework, allowing an agent
to balance sensory inputs against internal predictions in an optimal and con-
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text sensitive manner, through precision weighting (which is associated with890
attention) [8]. Supposedly the appropriate regulation of precision should also
emerge as a consequence of the minimisation of free energy, see Section 8 for a
description of this. But how the interplay between brain states and precisions
will unfold in an active agent involved in a complex behaviour is far from clear.
Where do the priors come from? This is an intuitive way to put a key895
challenge for models involving Bayesian inference [45]. To some extent the
FEP circumvents this problem via the concept of hierarchical models, which
maps neatly onto the framework of ‘empirical Bayes’ [44]. In this view, the
hierarchical structure allows priors at one level to be supplied by posteriors at
a higher level. Sensory data are assumed to reside only at the lowest level in900
the hierarchy, and the highest level is assumed to generate only spontaneous
random fluctuations. While this is a powerful idea within formal frameworks,
its practicality for guiding inference in active agents remains to be established.
These discussion points merely scratch the surface of the promises and pit-
falls of the FEP formalism, a formalism which is rapidly advancing both in its905
theoretical aspects and in its various implementations and applications. Never-
theless, research directed towards addressing these issues should further clarify
both the explanatory power and the practical utility of this increasingly influen-
tial framework. In this paper, we have focused on encapsulating within a single
presentation the essential mathematical aspects of the FEP and its implemen-910
tation. In doing so we hope to clarify the scientific contributions of the FEP,
facilitate discussions of some of the core issues and assumptions underlying it,
and motivate additional research to explore how far the grand ambitions of the
FEP can be realized in scientific practice.
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Appendix A. Variational Bayes: Ensemble learning1050
Here, we present an alternative approach to how the brain may achieve
true posterior density, which makes no assumptions about how the R-density
is encoded in the brain’s state; namely the Laplace approximation for the R-
density is dispensed with. Technically the above method is termed ‘Generalized
Filtering’ in [27] and the present one ‘Variational Filtering’ in [36].1055
According to equation (7) the IFE is a functional of the R-density qpϑq where
the variable ϑ denotes the environmental states collectively. The environmental
sub-states ϑα, α “ 1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N , must vary on distinctive time-scale, τ1 ă τ2 ă
¨ ¨ ¨ ă τN , where τα is associated with ϑα, conforming to physics laws, in general.
Then, the sub-densities may be assumed to be statistically-independent to allow
the factorization approximation for qpϑq as
qpϑq ”
Nź
i“1
qαpϑαq. (A.1)
Equation (4) gives rise to the individual normalization condition:ż
dϑ qpϑq “
Nź
α“1
ż
dϑα qαpϑαq “ 1
which asserts that ż
dϑα qαpϑαq “ 1. (A.2)
When the factorization approximation, equation (A.1) is substituted into equa-
tion (7), the IFE is written as
F “
ż ź
α
rdϑαqαpϑαqs
#
Epϑ, ϕq `
ÿ
σ
ln qσpϑσq
+
” F rqpϑq;ϕs
where the last expression indicates explicitly that the IFE is to be treated as
a functional of the R-density. We now optimize the IFE functional by taking
62
the variation of F with respect to a particular R-density qβpϑβq. We treat
the remainder of the ensemble densities as constant and use the normalization
constraint, equation (4), in the form
λ
˜ź
α
ż
dϑα qαpϑαq ´ 1
¸
“ 0 (A.3)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier.
A straightforward manipulation brings about
δβF “
ż
dϑβ
#ż ź
α‰β
dϑαqαpϑαq
˜
Epϑ, ϕq `
ÿ
σ
ln qσpϑσq
¸
` 1` λ
+
δqβ
where δβ represents a functional derivative with respect to qβpϑβq. Next, by
imposing δβF ” 0 it follows that the integration must vanish identically for any
change in δqβ ,ż ź
α‰β
dϑαqαpϑαq
˜
Epϑ, ϕq `
ÿ
σ
ln qσpϑσq
¸
` 1` λ “ 0
which is to be solved for qβpϑβq. The result brings out the optimal density for
the sub-state ϑβ as
q˚β “ exp
#
´pλ` 1q ´
ÿ
σ‰β
ż ź
α‰β
dϑαqαpϑαq ln qσpϑσq ´ Eβpϑβ , ϕq
+
(A.4)
where use has been made of the definition
Eβpϑβ , ϕq ”
ż ź
α‰β
dϑαqαpϑαqEpϑ, ϕq (A.5)
which is the partially-averaged energy [17, 18]. Here, it is worthwhile to note
that the following relation holdsż
dϑβ qβpϑβqEβpϑβ , ϕq “
ż
dϑ qpϑqEpϑ, ϕq,
which states that the expectation of the partially-averaged energy Eβpϑβ , ϕq
under qβpϑβq is the average energy, i.e. the first term in equation (9). The
undetermined Lagrange multiplier is now fixed by the normalization constraint,
equation (A.2), which results in„ż
dϑβ e
´Eβpϑβ ,ϕq

exp
#
´pλ` 1q ´
ÿ
σ‰β
ż ź
α‰β
dϑαqαpϑαq ln qσpϑσq
+
“ 1,
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which is to be solved for λ. When the determined λ is substituted back into
equation (A.4), the resulting ensemble-learned R-density can be expressed for-
mally as 3
q˚β pϑβq “ 1Zβ e
´Eβpϑβ ,ϕq (A.6)
where Zβ has been defined to be
Zβ ”
ż
dϑβ e
´Eβpϑβ ,ϕq. (A.7)
The superscript ˚ appearing in q˚β indicates that it is the solution which op-
timizes the IFE. The functional form of equation (A.6) is reminiscent of the1060
equilibrium canonical ensemble in statistical physics in which the normalization
factor Zβ is called the partition function of the subsystem tϑβu [37].
Under the factorization approximation, by substituting equation (A.6) into
equation (A.1), the R-density becomes
q˚pϑq “ 1
ZT
e´ET pϑ,ϕq (A.8)
where
ET pϑ, ϕq ”
Nÿ
α“1
Eαpϑα, ϕq and ZT ”
Nź
α“1
Zα “
ż
dϑe´ET pϑ,ϕq.
In equation (A.8) ZT may be called the ‘total’ partition function of the envi-
ronmental states and ET is the sum of the partially-averaged energies. Note
that, as a consequence of the ensemble-learning, the optimizing R-density ap-1065
proximates the posterior density ppϑ|ϕq (see Section 3 and below). In principle,
the optimizing R-density, equation (A.8), completes the ensemble-learning of
the sensory data. However, it does not provide a functionally fixed-form for
the optimal R-density. This is because the partially-averaged energy appearing
on the RHS of equation (A.8) is a functional of the R-density itself (see equa-1070
tion (A.5)). One possible way to obtain a closed form of q˚pϑ, ϕq is to seek
3Note that the minus sign arises in the exponent because we have defined the energy as
equation (10) differently from other papers on the free energy principle. We have made this
choice because our definition resembles the Boltzmann factor in the canonical ensemble in
statistical physics.
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a self-consistent solution: One starts with an educated guess (an ‘ansatz’) for
the optimal R-density to evaluate the partially-averaged energy, equation (A.5)
and uses the outcome to update the R-density, equation (A.6). This iterative
process is to be continued until a convergence reaches between estimation and1075
evaluation of the R-densities.
We now exploit what actually the optimal R-density, q˚β pϑβq given in equa-
tion (A.6), is. The partially averaged-energy appearing in q˚β can be manipulated
as
Eβpϑβ , ϕq “
ż ź
α‰β
dϑαqαpϑαqEpϑ, ϕq
“ ´
ÿ
σ
ż ź
α‰β
dϑαqαpϑαq ln ppϑσ, ϕσq, (A.9)
where we have used the factorization approximation for the G-density appearing
in the energy E “ ´ ln ppϑ, ϕq as
ppϑ, ϕq “
ź
σ
ppϑσ, ϕσq “
ź
σ
ppϑσ|ϕσqppϕσq. (A.10)
Next, one can separate out the environmental sub-state ϑβ among summation
on the RHS of equation (A.9) to cast it into
Eβpϑβ , ϕq “ ´ ln ppϑβ , ϕβq ´
ÿ
σ‰β
ż ź
α‰β
dϑαqαpϑαq ln ppϑσ, ϕσq. (A.11)
Then, it follows from equation (A.6) that
q˚β pϑβq “ e
´Eβpϑβ ,ϕqş
dϑβ e´Eβpϑβ ,ϕq
Ñ ppϑβ , ϕβqş
dϑβppϑβ , ϕβq “ ppϑβ |ϕβq,
where the last step can be obtained by noticing the identity, ppϑβ , ϕβq “
ppϑβ |ϕβqppϕβq, and
ş
dϑβppϑβ , ϕβq “ ppϕβq. Finally, the ensemble-learned R-
density, equation (A.8), is given by
q˚pϑq “
ź
α
qα˚pϑαq “
ź
α
ppϑα|ϕαq “ ppϑ|ϕq. (A.12)
Equation (A.12) states that the R-density qpϑq is directed to the posterior ppϑ|ϕq1080
when the IFE, equation (7) is minimized, conforming to the idea of variational
Bayes.
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By substituting the optimal R-density, equation (A.12), into expression for
IFE given in equation (7), we can also obtain the minimized IFE as
F˚ “
ż
dϑ q˚pϑq ln q
˚pϑq
ppϑ, ϕq
“
ż
dϑ q˚pϑq ln ppϑ|ϕq
ppϑ|ϕqppϕq
“ ´ ln ppϕq
ż
dϑ q˚pϑq
“ ´ ln ppϕq. (A.13)
where we have used equation (A.12) in moving to second line and the normal-1085
ization condition for q˚pϑq in the last step. Note that we have made it explicit
that the sensory density ppϕq is conditioned on the biological agent m. Thus,
we have come to a conclusion that the minimum IFE provides a tight bound on
surprisal.
In summary, the variation of the IFE functional with respect to the R-density1090
(ensemble-learning) has allowed us to specify an optimal (ensemble-learned) R-
density, q˚pϑ, ϕq, selected among an ensemble of R-densities. The specified
R-density is the brain’s solution to statistical inference of the posterior density
about the environmental states given sensory inputs. The minimum IFE, fixed
in this way, is identical to the surprisal. To fulfill this it was assumed that dis-1095
tinctive independent time-scales characterize environmental sub-states (the fac-
torization approximation). The ensemble-learned R-density of each partitioned
variable set ϑβ , q
˚
β pϑβq, is specified by the corresponding partially-averaged en-
ergy (see equation (A.6)). The influence from other environmental sets tϑσu
(σ ‰ β) occurs as their average effect: Their complicated interactions have1100
been averaged out in equation (A.5). In this sense, ϑβ may be regarded as a
‘mean-field’ of the environmental states. Accordingly, the procedure described
in the above is sometimes referred to as a mean-field approximation [20, 36].
Appendix B. Dynamic Bayesian Thermostat
% A Simple Bayesian Thermostat1105
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% A f r e e energy p r i n c i p l e f o r ac t i on and percept i on s c i e n c e s : A mathematical eva lua t i on
% Chr i s topher L . Buckley , Chang Sub Kim, Simon M. McGregor and Ani l K. Seth
c l e a r ;
rng ( 6 ) ;
%s imu la t i on params1110
simTime=100; dt =0.005; time =0: dt : simTime ;
N =length ( time ) ;
a c t i on =true ;
%Genereta ive Model Parameters
Td = 4 ; %d e s i r e d temperature1115
%Time we trun on ac t i on
actionTime =simTime /4 ;
%i n i t i a l i s e s e n s o r s1120
rho 0 (1 ) =0;
rho 1 (1)=0;
%sensory va r i ance s
Omega z0 =0.1 ;1125
Omega z1 =0.1 ;
%hidden s t a t e va r i ance s
Omega w0 =.1;
Omega w1 =.1;
1130
%Params f o r g e n e r a t i v e p roce s s
T0 = 100 ; %temperature at x=0
%i n t i a l i s e bra in s t a t e v a r i a b l e s
mu 0 (1)=0;1135
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mu 1 (1)=0;
mu 2 (1)=0;
% sensory no i s e in the n e g e r a t e i v e proe s s
zgp 0 = randn (1 ,N) ∗ . 1 ;1140
zgp 1 = randn (1 ,N) ∗ . 1 ;
%I n i t i a l i s e ac t i on v a r a i b l e
a (1 ) =0;
1145
%I n i t i a l i s e g e ne r a t i v e p roce s s
x dot (1 ) = a ( 1 ) ;
x (1 ) = 2 ;
T(1) = T0/( x (1)ˆ2+1) ;
Tx(1)= ´2∗T0∗x ( 1 )∗ ( x(1)ˆ2+1)ˆ´2;1150
T dot (1 ) = Tx( 1 )∗ ( x dot ( 1 ) ) ;
%I n i t i a l i s e sensory input
rho 0 (1 ) = T( 1 ) ;
rho 1 (1 ) = T dot ( 1 ) ;1155
%I n t i a l i s e e r r o r terms
e p s i l o n z 0 = ( rho 0 (1)´mu 0 ( 1 ) ) ;
e p s i l o n z 1 = ( rho 1 (1)´mu 1 ( 1 ) ) ;
1160
ep s i l on w 0 = (mu 1(1)+mu 0(1)´Td ) ;
ep s i l on w 1 = (mu 2(1)+mu 1 ( 1 ) ) ;
%I n t i a l i s e V a r i a t i o n a l Energy
IFE (1) = 1/Omega z0∗ e p s i l o n z 0 ˆ2/2 . . .1165
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+ 1/Omega z1∗ e p s i l o n z 1 ˆ2/2 . . .
+1/Omega w0∗ ep s i l on w 0 ˆ2/2 . . .
+1/Omega w1∗ ep s i l on w 1 ˆ2/2 . . .
+1/2∗ l og (Omega w0∗Omega w1∗Omega z0∗Omega z1 ) ;
1170
%Gradient descent l e a r n i n g params
k =.1; %f o r i n f e r e n c e
ka =.01; %f o r l e a r n i n g
1175
f o r i =2:N
%The ge n e r a t i v e p roce s s
x dot ( i ) = a ( i ´1);% ac t i on
x ( i ) = x ( i´1)+dt ∗( x dot ( i ) ) ;1180
T( i ) = T0/( x ( i )ˆ2+1);
Tx( i )= ´2∗T0∗x ( i )∗ ( x ( i )ˆ2+1)ˆ´2;
T dot ( i ) = Tx( i )∗ ( x dot ( i ) ) ;
rho 0 ( i ) = T( i ) + zgp 0 ( i ) ; %c a l c l a u t e sensory input1185
rho 1 ( i ) = T dot ( i ) + zgp 1 ( i ) ;
%The ge n e r a t i v e model
e p s i l o n z 0 = ( rho 0 ( i´1)´mu 0( i ´1));% e r r o r terms
e p s i l o n z 1 = ( rho 1 ( i´1)´mu 1( i ´1)) ;1190
ep s i l on w 0 = (mu 1( i´1)+mu 0( i´1)´Td ) ;
ep s i l on w 1 = (mu 2( i´1)+mu 1( i ´1)) ;
IFE( i ) = 1/Omega z0∗ e p s i l o n z 0 ˆ2/2 . . .1195
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+1/Omega z1∗ e p s i l o n z 1 ˆ2/2 . . .
+1/Omega w0∗ ep s i l on w 0 ˆ2/2 . . .
+1/Omega w1∗ ep s i l on w 1 ˆ2/2 . . .
+1/2∗ l og (Omega w0∗Omega w1∗Omega z0∗Omega z1 ) ;
1200
mu 0( i ) = mu 0( i ´1) . . .
+dt ∗(mu 1( i´1)´k∗(´ e p s i l o n z 0 /Omega z0 . . .
+eps i l on w 0 /Omega w0 ) ) ;
mu 1( i ) = mu 1( i ´1) +dt ∗(mu 2( i´1)´ k∗(´ e p s i l o n z 1 /Omega z1 . . .1205
+eps i l on w 0 /Omega w0+eps i l on w 1 /Omega w1 ) ) ;
mu 2( i ) = mu 2( i ´ 1 ) . . .
+dt∗´k∗( ep s i l on w 1 /Omega w1 ) ;
1210
i f ( time ( i ) >25)
a ( i ) = a ( i ´1) +dt∗´ka∗Tx( i )∗ e p s i l o n z 1 /Omega z1 ; %a c t i v e i n f e r e n c e
e l s e
a ( i ) = 0 ;1215
end
end
f i g u r e ( 1 ) ; c l f ;
1220
f i g u r e ( 1 ) ;
subplot ( 5 , 1 , 1 )
p l o t ( time ,T) ; hold on ;1225
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p lo t ( time , x ) ; hold on ;
legend ( ’T’ , ’ x ’ )
subplot ( 5 , 1 , 2 )
p l o t ( time , mu 0 , ’ k ’ ) ; hold on ;1230
p lo t ( time , mu 1 , ’m’ ) ; hold on ;
p l o t ( time , mu 2 , ’ b ’ ) ; hold on ;
legend ( ’\mu’ , ’ \mu’ , ’ \mu’ ) ;
1235
subplot ( 5 , 1 , 3 )
p l o t ( time , rho 0 , ’ k ’ ) ; hold on ;
p l o t ( time , rho 1 , ’m’ ) ; hold on ;
legend ( ’\ rho ’ , ’ \ rho ’ ) ;1240
subplot ( 5 , 1 , 4 )
p l o t ( time , a , ’ k ’ ) ;
y l a b e l ( ’ a ’ )
1245
subplot ( 5 , 1 , 5 )
p l o t ( time , IFE , ’ k ’ ) ; x l a b e l ( ’ time ’ ) ; hold on ;
y l a b e l ( ’ IFE ’ )
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Table 1. Mathematical Objects in the IFE
Symbol Name Description
ϑ Environmental states These refer to all states outside of the brain and in-
clude both environmental and bodily variables.
ϕ Sensory data Signals caused by the environment.
qpϑq R-density Organism’s (implicit) probabilistic representation of
environmental states which cause sensory data.
ppϕ, ϑq G-density Joint probability density, encoded in the brain relat-
ing sensory data to environmental states. Assumed
to be encoded in a form which makes ppϕ|ϑq and ppϑq
accessible, but not ppϑ|ϕq or ppϕq.
ppϑq Prior density Organism’s prior beliefs, encoded in the brain’s state,
about environmental states.
ppϕ|ϑq Likelihood density Organism’s implicit beliefs about how environmental
states map to sensory data.
ppϑ|ϕq Posterior density The inference that a perfectly rational agent (with in-
complete knowledge) would make about the environ-
ment’s state upon observing new sensory information,
given the organism’s prior assumptions.
ppϕq Sensory density Probability density of the sensory input, encoded in
the brain’s state, which cannot be directly quantified
given sensory data alone.
´ ln ppϕq Surprisal Surprise or self-information in information-theory
terminology, which is equal to the negative of log
model evidence in Bayesian statistics.
F Information-theoretic free
energy (IFE)
The quantity minimised under the FEP which forms
an upper bound on surprisal allows the approximation
of the posterior density.
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Table 2. Mathematical objects in the Laplace encoding
Symbol Name Description
F rqpϑq;ϕs Variational IFE A functional (higher-order function) of the R-
density qpϑq and a function of the sensory data
ϕ.
N pϑ;µ, ζq (Gaussian) fixed-form R-
density
An ‘ansatz’ for unknown qpϑq (the Laplace approx-
imation)
µ, ζ Parameters for the R-
density
Sufficient statistics (expectation and variance) of
the fixed-form R-density, encoded in the brain’s
state.
ζ˚ Optimal variance Analytically derivable optimal ζ, removing an ex-
plicit dependence of F on ζ.
ppϕ, µq Laplace-encoded G-
density
The G-density in which dependence on ϑ has been
replaced with a dependence on µ.
Epµ, ϕq Laplace-encoded energy Mathematical construct defined to be ´ ln ppµ, ϕq.
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Table 3. Mathematical glossary in the generative models
Symbol Name & Description
Simple model ppϕ, µq “ ppϕ|µqppµq
gpµ; θq Generative mapping between the brain states µ and the observed data
ϕ, paramterised by θ
z, w Random fluctuations represented by Gaussian noise
σz, σw That variance of these fluctuations (the inverse of precisions)
ppϕ|µq, ppµq Likelihood, prior of µ, which together determine ppϕ, µq
Dynamical model ppϕ, µq “ś8n“0 ppϕrns|µrnsqppµrn`1s|µrnsq
µ˜ Brain states in generalized coordinates; an infinite vector whose com-
ponents are given by successive time-derivatives, µ˜ ” pµ, µ1, µ2, ¨ ¨ ¨ q ”
pµr0s, µr1s, µr2s, ¨ ¨ ¨ q.
ϕ˜ Sensory data, similarly defined as ϕ˜ “ pϕ,ϕ1, ϕ2, ¨ ¨ ¨ q.
ϕrns “ grns ` zrns Generalized mapping between the observed data ϕ and the brain states
µ at the dynamical order n
µrn`1s “ frns ` wrns Generalized equations of motion of the brain state µ at the dynamical
order n
grns, frns Generative functions in the generalized coordinates
ppϕrns|µrnsq Likelihood of the generalized state µrns, given the data ϕrns
ppµrn`1s|µrnsq Gaussian prior of the generalized state µrns
74
Table 4. Mathematical constructs in the hierarchical generative model
Symbol Name & Description
Hierarchical model ppϕ, µq “ ppµpMqqśM´1i“0 ppµpiq|µpi`1qq
µpiq Brain states at cortical layer i (i “ 1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,M); µp0q ” ϕ denotes the
sensory data which reside at the lowest cortical layer.
gpiqpµpiqq Generative map (or function) of the brain state µpiq to estimate one-
level lower state µpi´1q in the cortical hierarchy via µpi´1q “ gpiqpµpiqq`
zpi´1q; where zpi´1q is Gaussian noise.
ppµpiq|µpi`1qq Likelihood of µpiq given a value for µpi`1q; which acts as a prior for
ppµpi´1q|µpiqq in the cortical hierarchy.
ppµpMqq Probabilistic representation of brain states at the highest layer, which
forms the highest prior.
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Table 5. Mathematical constructs in the full generative model
Symbol Name & Description
Full construct ppϕ˜α, µ˜αq “ ppx˜pMqα , v˜pMqα qśM´1i“0 ppx˜piqα |v˜piqα qppv˜piqα |x˜pi`1qα , v˜pi`1qα q
µ˜
piq
α Brain state α in cortical layer i in generalized coordinates, whose nth
component is denoted as µ
piq
αrns.
x˜
piq
α , v˜
piq
α Two distinctive neuronal representations, µ˜
piq
α “ px˜piqα , v˜piqα q; designated
as hidden and causal states, respectively.
g˜
piq
α Generative map of the causal state v˜
piq
α to learn the state one layer
below, v˜
pi´1q
α “ g˜piqα px˜piqα , v˜piqα q ` z˜pi´1qα .
f˜
piq
α Generative function which induces the Langevin-type equation of mo-
tion of the hidden state x˜
piq
α , 9˜xpiqα “ f˜ piqα px˜piqα , v˜piqα q ` w˜piqα .
z˜
piq
α , w˜
piq
α Random fluctuations treated as Gaussian noise.
ppx˜pMqα , v˜pMqα q Prior density of the brain state µ˜α at the highest cortical layer pMq.
ppx˜piqα |v˜piqα q Probabilistic representation of the intra-layer dynamics of hidden
states x˜
piq
α conditioned on the causal state v˜
piq
α via f˜
piq
α ; dynamic tran-
sition from order n to n`1 is hypothesized as the Gaussian fluctuation
of w
piq
αrns “ xpiqαrn`1s ´ f piqαrns.
ppv˜piqα |x˜pi`1qα , v˜pi`1qα q Likelihood density of the causal state v˜piq which serves as a prior for
one layer lower density, representing statistically the inter-layer map
between two successive causal states, z
piq
αrns “ vpiqαrns ´ gpi`1qαrns , by the
Gaussian fluctuation.
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Table 6. Mathematical objects for recognition dynamics
Symbol Name & Description
∇µ˜Epµ˜, ϕ˜q ‘Gradient’ of the Laplace encoded-energy: Multi-dimensional deriva-
tive of the scalar function E; which vanishes at an optimum µ˜˚.
Dynamical construct 9˜µpiqα ´Dµ˜piqα “ ´κα∇µ˜piqα Epµ˜, ϕ˜q, µ˜
piq
α “ px˜piqα , v˜piqα q
µ˜
piq
α Generalized brain states: A point in the generalized state space to
represent fast ‘time-dependent’ neuronal activity µα on each cortical
layer i [see equations (70) and (71)].
9˜µpiqα , Dµ˜piqα 9˜µpiqα is the ‘path of the mode’; Dµ˜piqα is the ‘mode of the path’. 9˜µpiqα
represents the rate of change of a brain state in generalized state space,
while Dµ˜
piq
α represents the encoded motion in the brain; when the
two become identical, i.e. 9˜µpiqα “ Dµ˜piqα , in the course of recognition
dynamics, E reaches its minimum.
Static construct :µpiqβ “ ´κβµˆpiqβ ¨∇µβEpµ˜, ϕ˜; θ, γq, µβ “ θ, γ
Λ˜
αpiq
z , Λ˜
αpiq
w Precisions: Inverse variances in the generalised coordinates [see equa-
tion (84)].
θ
piq
α , γ
piq
α Parameters, hyper-parameters: The slow brain states are treated
‘static’ and are associated with θ
piq
α and γ
piq
α , respectively, on each
cortical layer; where θ
piq
α appear as parameters in the generative func-
tions g
piq
α and f
piq
α , and γ
piq
α are hyper-parameters in the precisions
Λ
αpiq
z and Λ
αpiq
w .
ξ˜
αpiq
z , ξ˜
αpiq
w Prediction errors; measuring the discrepancy between the observation
and the evaluation [e.g. equations (88), (89)]
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